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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Jewish Tourism to the Occupied Palestinian Territories and its Effects on Diaspora Identities 
and Politics 
 
 
by 
 
 
Emily Maureen Schneider 
 
The deployment of tourism to strengthen diaspora ties is well documented, however 
sociologists have yet to examine the use of tourism to complicate transnational diaspora 
allegiances. Jewish tourism to the Palestinian Territories offers a compelling case to study 
this growing trend, as more non-Israeli Jews are foregoing standard trips to Israel and instead 
visiting sites in Israel/Palestine that challenge dominant Zionist narratives. Using a mixed 
methods approach that combines pre/post tour surveys with longitudinal in-depth interviews, 
I investigate how this emerging form of tourism shapes participants' political views, 
identities, and activism. I find that tourists often experience significant ideological tension 
when they criticize a base country, while still seeing themselves as part of its national 
collective. However, rather than compel participants to sever their ties to the base country 
(Israel), this tension can actually lead to increased engagement on the part of the diaspora 
member, even when it is in the form of activism directed against the state. Jewish tourism to 
the Palestinian Territories appears to facilitate this kind of diasporic tension, while also 
causing participants to "humanize" a previously demonized population, Palestinians. Though 
such "humanization" does not always lead to overt changes in political views, it influences 
 	   v	  
participants' willingness to embrace counter national narratives. These results suggest that 
this unique form of "homeland" tourism can engender political criticism within diaspora 
populations, while simultaneously solidifying transnational ties. It is this contradictory 
process - solidifying ties to a base country while promoting political criticism of it - that I 
discuss in my thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“You go on the tour and you realize that these are two antithetical things, and you can 
either be a moral person or a pro-Israeli person. I mean which one did I want to be? I 
had never questioned it before… it made me feel wrong about myself, about part of 
my upbringing, and about what I believe.”  
–Louis, May 20, 2014 
 
 
A group of Jewish college students from the United States are standing nervously at a 
checkpoint in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). They are packed, shoulder-to-
shoulder with hundreds of Palestinians, crammed between metal fencing and barbed wire. 
Israeli soldiers pace ominously above them in their security towers, their M-16s aiming 
directly at the group. Israeli flags with the Star of David featured prominently in the middle 
wave from the tops of the towers. This is the first time these young Jews find themselves on 
the other side of the wall,1 and by extension on the “other side” of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. For many of these tourists, their upbringings involved reciting the Israeli national 
anthem, writing letters of support to Israeli soldiers, and dressing up in Israeli army uniforms 
at Jewish summer camp. Now that these Jewish-Americans suddenly find themselves on the 
receiving end of Israel’s military occupation, their relationship to Zionism and their 
understandings of their Jewish identities will probably never be the same.  
This snapshot is an example of what many young Jews experience when they 
participate in an alternative tour to the OPT. Jewish tourism to the land of Israel has a long 
history that predates the founding of the modern Israeli state. For centuries, Jews from across 
the world have been traveling to the region to explore their ancestral roots and connect with 
their Jewish identities (Kelner 2010). Recently however, a growing number of Jews living 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This refers to Israel’s separation barrier, which is being built around and through the West Bank, further 
restricting Palestinian movement and usurping 9.4% of West Bank land 
http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/features/barrier-monitoring-unit?id=908 
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outside of Israel are traveling to the OPT to meet Palestinians and to engage with 
perspectives that challenge unconditional Jewish support for the Israeli state. 
Prior to Israel’s establishment in 1948, Jewish identity relied less heavily on 
nationalist forms of identification (i.e., Zionism), and centered instead on religious and 
cultural understandings of Judaism (Gitelman 1998). As Sand (2012) explains, a collective 
longing for possessive ownership of a Jewish ancestral homeland was practically non-
existent throughout the majority of Jewish history. However since the rise of Zionism in the 
late 19th century, Jews increasingly understand their Jewishness through their relationship to 
political Zionism. For many European Jews, this identification sprang or intensified 
following the rise of the Nazi Party and the start of World War II, and for Jews in North 
America and the Middle East after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 (Sand 2012).  
Presently, slightly less than half of the world’s Jewish population lives in Israel, with 
the largest majority of non-Israeli Jews residing in North America (DellaPergola 2014). 
These American Jews, along with Jews mainly from Europe, Latin America, and Russia 
frequently travel to Israel on programs that are intended to strengthen ethno-national ties and 
elicit political and financial support from participants. Many programs also operate under the 
goal of encouraging “aliyah,” the Hebrew word for “going up,” which refers to Jewish 
immigration to Israel. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on Jewish tourism to Israel by 
highlighting a relatively new type of Jewish travel that breaks with mainstream heritage and 
religious tours. While in the past, most Jews have traveled to Israel/Palestine to reaffirm and 
strengthen their connection to Jewish history and nationalism; a growing number of non-
Israeli Jews are visiting Israel and the OPT to engage with criticism of Zionism and the 
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Israeli state. Through a case study on a tour program called Walls2Windows, I investigate 
this emerging form of Jewish tourism that seeks to complicate rather than strengthen Jewish 
ethno-national ties to Israel. The Walls2Windows program targets Jewish tourists who have 
finished participating in a traditional, nationalistic tour, and brings them to the OPT to hear 
Palestinian voices and witness the conditions of life under occupation. The goal of these 
tours is to disrupt mainstream Jewish national narratives and to engender greater support for 
Palestinians’ human rights.  
I investigate these alternative tours not only to contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of Jewish tourism to Israel, but also to address a new development in the wider 
field of diaspora tourism. While the use of tourism to strengthen national ties is widely 
documented, the deployment of tourism to critique transnational diaspora allegiances has yet 
to be studied. Scholars do not yet know what happens when travel to a “diaspora homeland” 
is conducted in the context of political criticism that intentionally challenges dominant 
nationalist discourses. Studying this phenomenon sheds light on a number of questions: How 
do people sustain ethnic and cultural ties while distancing themselves from the political and 
national aspects of their collective identity? Is tourism an effective tool to elicit criticism of 
exclusionary national narratives and political discourse? And can a single travel experience 
spark political dissent and activism? By looking at this new strand of tourism in the context 
of Jewish national identity, I probe how tourism, in general, cultivates and challenges group 
solidarities and transforms political allegiances, while also addressing larger issues of how 
nationalism may be reimagined to foster greater commitments to diversity and equality. 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 IDENTITY 
“Jewishness disrupts the very categories of identity because it is not national, not 
genealogical, not religious, but all of these in dialectical tension with one another.”  
(Boyarin and Boyarin 2003, p. 109) 
 
Jewish tourists to the OPT actively pursue information that contradicts some of the 
most foundational, but also the most fragile, elements of Jewish national identity, or Zionism. 
By looking into the processes of identity construction and change that these tourists 
experience, this thesis focuses not on what holds our identities within the bounds of stable, 
bordered categories, but what information and which experiences may be able to break these 
identities apart so that they can be rebuilt along the lines of more just and inclusive 
approaches to nationalism. While this thesis focuses on the personal identity construction 
process for a small group of individuals, it holds implications for wider, political 
reimaginings of Zionism and Jewish identity.  
For Stuart Hall (1994), identity is a production, something that is always in process 
and never complete. There is a common tendency to perceive identity as a shared culture 
based in common historical experiences and symbolic codes. This perception can lead 
individuals to view their identities as truths, which may then translate into political 
movements that embrace essentialist tendencies. While movements grounded in identity 
politics can offer a powerful force for liberation and for the representation of marginalized 
peoples, they can also prevent an acceptance of identities’ fluid and diverse qualities. 
Accordingly, Hall emphasizes the importance of probing difference within our various group 
identifications. As he states: 
We cannot speak for very long, with any exactness, about ‘one experience, one 
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identity.’ Rather than a matter of being, identity is a matter of becoming. It is not 
found in a recovery of the past, instead, identity exists in how we currently position 
ourselves within the narratives of the past. (p. 225) 
 
Hall’s views on identity are echoed by others who affirm the fluidity of identity and 
the need to move away from static notions of ethnicity and culture. Like Hall, Rodriguez 
(2003) centers her approach to identity in difference, noting how the contradictions within 
identities serve to produce new subjectivities and knowledge. Drawing on Deleuze’s (1983) 
“rhizomes,” Rodriguez calls for the rejection of identity binaries in order to recognize the 
ways that identities are constantly breaking, diverging, and growing to create new 
formations. She encourages her readers to think of identity as more than just a list of 
categories by emphasizing how the borders of identities are always malleable.  
Rodriquez also suggests that we should focus not just on what identity is, but more 
importantly, what identity is for. In thinking about Jewish national identity, my goal is not to 
reveal the contents of such identities but to interrogate their political consequences. What 
elements of Jewish national identity may obstruct the realization of a truly egalitarian society 
in Israel/Palestine, and which aspects may be reimagined and redirected to facilitate one?  
While theorists such as Hall and Rodriguez focus on the larger epistemological 
debates surrounding identity, structural identity theory examines the link between social 
structures and identity by explaining how individuals use sets of meanings to define their 
relationships to certain roles or situations (Burke and Stets 2009). One of the main theories 
from this field, “Identity Control Theory” (ICD), defines identities as “sets of meanings 
people hold for themselves that define ‘what it means’ to be who they are as persons, as role 
occupants, and as group members” (Burke 2004: 5). In this way, identities provide a link 
between individuals’ self-perceptions and societal expectations of them, which are largely 
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defined by culture. Within ICD, researchers have focused on the identity verification process, 
which occurs when people’s self-perceptions align with societal roles and expectations of 
them. Such research has shown that individuals will strive to match their self-meanings to 
identity categories, and as a result, will seek out information and experiences that reinforce 
their identities, and avoid information and experiences that challenge them (Swann 1983).   
Theoretically, this process would create a world of neat, separate categories that 
constantly protect themselves from disruption. However as scholars of queer theory and other 
critical approaches have shown, individuals often engage in resistance to societally imposed 
identities, and form their own unique, sometimes overtly political, understandings and 
presentations of their selves (Rupp and Taylor 2014). While structural identity theory 
primarily focuses on how categories are sustained, it also makes room for interpretation and 
malleability, though these changes are usually attributed to shifts in power and resources 
(Burke 2004). Therefore, while we may find evidence of identity categories’ durability and 
resistance to change, it is also undeniable that identities are always in flux. Throughout 
history, one finds an endless supply of redefinitions, disappearances, and births of new 
identity categories, often stemming from intentional political projects. Even in the present, 
we may encounter people who are readily seeking information that challenges their senses of 
self and the meanings they hold, such as Jewish tourists to the OPT.  
Drawing on the contributions of Black liberation movements in the United States, 
Singh (2005) suggests that identity-based histories of oppression and struggle can aid in the 
realization of more just universalities. Because marginalized populations build narratives and 
ideologies through the lived experience of stigma and exclusion, they are in a better position 
to articulate the qualities of a truly liberatory form of social organization. However, contrary 
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to the hopefulness that Singh sees for Black nationalism, Jewish nationalism has taken an 
opposite course; Jewish leaders often manipulate the memory of the Holocaust and other 
periods of persecution to facilitate the current oppression of Palestinians (Finkelstein 2000). 
To counter this trend, alternative tours in Israel/Palestine attempt to redirect such uses of 
Jewish collective consciousness, so that memories of the Holocaust and historical 
marginalization can motivate Jewish participants to work towards the liberation of others, 
especially Palestinians. With this project in mind, I turn now to the topic of diaspora in order 
to investigate the ways that Jewish diaspora has been used to obstruct the attainment of 
liberation for Palestinians, and to imagine how it may be rearticulated to facilitate it.   
 
1.1.1 Diaspora and Exile 
Diaspora is generally understood to refer to populations who “define themselves by 
reference to a distant homeland from which they once originated” (Barber 2001). Even 
though the term “diaspora” originally described Jews living outside of what is now the state 
of Israel, today it refers to any group that is scattered throughout the world from their 
historical homeland and still maintains a common bond of ethnicity, religion, culture, and/or 
national identity (Coles and Timothy 2004). Keeping with his emphasis on fluidity and 
difference, Hall (1994) rejects the centrality of collective, physical return in his conception of 
diaspora. As he states: 
Diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured 
in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return, even if it 
means pushing other people into the sea. (p. 235) 
Accordingly, scholars of diaspora identity such as Hall and Said (1998) instead focus on the 
ways that groups articulate their identities in terms of hybridity and transformation, 
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emphasizing the experience of diaspora, not the elimination of it. Said speaks personally of 
forced diaspora, or exile, when he states, “Israel/Palestine was no longer a place I could live 
in” (1998: ix) and “wherever we Palestinians are, we are not in our Palestine, which no 
longer exists” (1998: 11). For Said diaspora identity is formed in acknowledgement of the 
absence of a tangible, geographic location for return. Like Hall, Said finds the resolution of 
exile not in the total return to an earlier geographic and cultural location, but through the 
creation of a new space based on the eradication of exile for everyone. As he declares: 
The proof of whatever small success we have had is not that we have regained a 
homeland, or acquired a new one; rather, it is that some Israelis have admitted the 
possibility of sharing a common space with us, in Palestine. (p. 43) 
 
Therefore, for Palestinians such as Said, as for many other populations in exile, diaspora is 
not a quest for control over a particular territory that serves as a protected, ethnically pure 
nucleus. Instead diaspora is rooted in struggle, opposition, and a longing that is expected to 
never fully materialize.  
 For Jewish diaspora identity however, that longing has materialized, thanks to the 
spoils of colonialism, European/white identity and racism, and the acquisition of significant 
military and financial resources. Hall (1994) refers explicitly to Zionism when he states: 
This is the old, the imperialising, the hegemonising, form of 'ethnicity'. We have seen 
the fate of the people of Palestine at the hands of this backward-looking conception of 
diaspora - and the complicity of the West with it. (p. 235) 
Thus while Hall and others call for a move away from an essentialized notion of identity that 
focuses on return, current forms of Jewish national identity are often deeply rooted in 
stagnant conceptions of peoplehood and place. This approach to Jewish identity is seen 
through Israeli legislation like the “Law of Return,” which guarantees every Jewish person 
outside of Israel the right to Israeli citizenship. The Law of Return can be contrasted with 
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Israel’s refusal to recognize the Palestinians’ “Right of Return,” whereby Israel denies 
Palestinian refugees who were expelled from the state in 1948 the right to return to their 
homes in present-day Israel. These policies, along with other corresponding measures to 
control the ethnic make-up of Israel, such as those concerning African asylum seekers, 
aggressively encourage Jewish immigration while limiting non-Jewish immigration and 
containing the size and power of the non-Jewish population in Israel. As a result, the state of 
Israel now exists as a material manifestation of remedying diaspora through mass, physical 
“return.” Therefore, even if other scholars and members of diaspora groups reject the belief 
that diaspora identity can only be secured through returning at all costs to a sacred homeland, 
for many Jews, national identity is deeply rooted in such physical return, and for some 
extreme Jewish nationalists, this return must come at any cost. 
Other Jews however reject this belief in physical return (Sand 2012, Butler 2012, 
Boyarin and Boyarin 2003), and it is that rejection of Zionism that is prioritized in this study. 
In Theorizing Diaspora, Boyarin and Boyarin (2003) offer a passionate appeal for the revival 
of diaspora, not Zionism, as the central, organizing tenet of Jewish identity. Rivaling even 
monotheism, they suggest that diaspora may be Judaism’s greatest ideological contribution, 
as it teaches that there is no organic or natural connection between peoples and land. They 
trace an insistence on ethnic land rights to much of the world’s violence, and accordingly 
argue that Jewish identity should move away from a focus on geography, and instead 
celebrate the generational connections among Jews.  
Combining a fierce anti-assimilationist stance with an equally fervent opposition to 
nationalism, Boyarin and Boyarin (2003) contend that while the separatism that Jews 
practiced in the diaspora was highly moral and functioned to preserve Jewish beliefs and 
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traditions, its application in the context of Jewish hegemony is inappropriate and oppressive. 
This leads them to claim that the acquisition of land, as tied to Jewish racial or ethnic 
identity, is inherently flawed, and that all attempts to realize Jewish identity through 
territorial sovereignty must be relinquished to regain collective moral legitimacy. Instead of 
striving for a “proud resting place,” they suggest that Jewish identity should be defined by a 
permanent state of dispersal, composed of “perpetual, creative, diasporic, tension” (2003: 
103).  
 Yet despite the poignant analytical pleas of scholars such as Boyarin and Boyarin, 
Sand, and Butler to dissociate modern, Israel-centric Zionism from Jewish identity, the 
current contours of Zionism cannot be argued back into a previous form of so-called 
benevolent diaspora. In addition, even if in its earlier manifestations Zionism exhibited 
aspects of an oppositional identity, Jewish diaspora in the form of Zionism can no longer be 
categorized alongside truly exiled nations. Therefore, for those interested in challenging 
Zionism, it is insufficient to only analyze it through romanticized notions of Jewish history 
and biblical teachings. Instead, any critical analysis must also engage with Zionism in terms 
of the fully institutionalized, ethnic nationalism that is has become.  
 
1.2 NATIONALISM  
To conceptualize nationalism I employ Benedict Anderson’s (1991) definition of the 
nation as “an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign” (p. 6). Since I focus on the identities of Jews living outside of Israel, the notion of 
an “imagined community” is particularly useful as these individuals are largely removed 
territorially, culturally, and linguistically from the community that they consider to be 
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essential to their group identification. 
Despite the rise of transnationalism alongside long-standing predictions of 
nationalism’s declining appeal (Appadurai 1996; Hobsbawm 1990; Williams 2002), 
Anderson, among others (Sand 2012), confidently declares that nationalism is thriving. As he 
states: 
The reality is quite plain: the 'end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not 
remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the 
political life of our time. (p. 3)  
Anderson outlines three paradoxes that are prevalent in theories of nationalism. The first 
deals with historians’ objectivist approach to modernity compared with the subjective 
appearance of nationalism to nationalists themselves. The second refers to the universal 
appeal of nationalism (Arendt 1966), in that everyone can and should have a nation 
contrasted with its highly varied concrete forms. Third, unlike other “isms,” Anderson claims 
that nationalism lacks any grand thinkers or overarching philosophical foundation. While the 
number of scholars studying nationalism has certainly grown since Anderson’s declaration, 
among sociologists, attention to nationalism and national identity still pales in comparison to 
attention devoted to categories such as gender and race. 
Much of the scholarship that seeks to address these paradoxes can be divided into two 
distinct categories: the ethnicist and the modernist perspective. The ethnicist approach stems 
from the primordialist view, which sees nations as ancient and natural. In contrast, 
modernists understand nationalism as a fluid and malleable force that resulted from historical 
processes such as industrialization, print capitalism, mapmaking, compulsory education and 
military conscription (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Giddens 1984; May 2008; Sand 2012). 
Modernists contend that before the rise of the modern nation-state, social life, identities and 
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loyalties were instead defined by local allegiances. 
In contrast, the primordialist approach describes nationalism as an element of human 
nature found throughout history. Anthony Smith (1991) maintains that the primordial 
perspective is plagued by a perception of nations as organic and the result of either a natural 
or religious “master plan.” Smith (1999), among others such as Brass (1991) and Grosby 
(1994), therefore dismisses the academic merit of primordialism, noting that although it 
accurately identifies the conditions and qualities of nationalism, it fails to describe its causes. 
 David McCrone (1998) argues that with the primordial perspective practically 
rejected within the academic community, today, the most relevant debate on nationalism 
exists between the modernists and the ethnicists. Like the primordialists, the ethnicists are 
convinced of nationalism’s enduring, ethnic character. However in contrast to primordialism, 
ethnicists reject the notion that ethnicity is inherent to humankind. Instead, ethnicists or 
ethno-symbolists maintain that ethnicity, though socially constructed, is a significant part of 
nationalism, and that our understanding of nationalism is best informed by the study of 
collective memories, cultures, and traditions.  
Considering Zionism’s exceptional level of Jewish symbolism, and use of biblical and 
ancient history to justify it, this study approaches Zionism from a primarily ethnicist 
perspective. This focus does not represent a rejection of the modernist view, but a recognition 
of the central role that ethnicity plays in Jewish nationalism. This is also not to say that the 
modernist perspective has no relevance to Zionism, as contrastingly demonstrated by 
Kedourie (1960), Hobsbawm (1983), and Gellner (1983) who each discuss Zionism’s parallel 
rise to fruition with other initially Europe-based nationalist movements. However, it cannot 
be denied that Jewish nationalism is infused with a distinct level of pre-modern, ethno-
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religious symbols, and that its materialization cannot be reduced to the effects of 
modernization alone. In short, it is impossible to understand Zionism in isolation from Jewish 
ethno-religious identity and collective consciousness. 
Other theorists, however, contend that Zionism cannot be fully explained by either 
approach. Israeli sociologist Yehouda Shenhav (2006) articulates this view: 
It is clear today that these models are not mutually exclusive and that the opposition 
between them has been largely exaggerated. Whereas the primordial model falls short 
of acknowledging the extent to which the past is engineered, the modernist model 
trivializes history, religion, and tradition and reduces nationalism to merely a political 
manipulation. (p. 3) 
 
As an alternative, Shenhav employs Latour’s (1993) model of modernity to explain Jewish 
nationalism in terms of “hybridization” and “purification.” Shenhav argues that while 
Zionism presents its religious and secular-nationalist components as separate, modern Jewish 
nationalism actually represents a hybridization of the religious (primordial) and the secular–
statist (modernist). Shenhav contends that Jewish nationalism is unique in this thorough 
blend of “Eastern religious-ethnicism” and “Western secularism and liberalism,” explaining 
that while Zionism was the manipulated, modern creation of largely secular, European 
nationalists, it is still deeply rooted in a primordial religious/ethnic connection to the ancient 
land of Israel and Jewish tradition.  
 
 
1.2.1 Ethnic versus Civic Nationalism 
 
Another theoretical model that helps to illuminate the contradictory currents in Jewish 
nationalism, or Zionism, is the ethnic versus civic nationalism paradigm. The ethnic-civic 
dichotomy has been applied to a diverse array of countries, peoples, and regions, including 
the Armenians, Kurds, the United States, Australia, Britain, Indonesia, France, Germany, 
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Russia, Malaysia, Turkey, Quebec, Islamic nationalism, Black nationalism, as well as many 
others (Augoustinos and Every 2008; Brubaker 1992; Condor 2006; Every and Greenfeld 
1992; Khazanov 1997; Kreuzer; Milley 2007; Smith 1999; Straughn 2008; Wood 2007).  
Ethnic nationalism is typically characterized by a strong connection to land and an emphasis 
on ancestry, religion, and cultural traditions (McCrone 1998). In contrast, civic nationalism is 
theoretically defined by political allegiances that are territorially rather than ethnically 
sustained (McCrone 1998). Civic nationalism is also usually rooted in democratic ideals, and 
in appearance, strives for equality among its citizens (Ignatieff 1993). Accordingly, civic 
nationalism is thought to promote tolerance and liberal values, while ethnic nationalism is 
typically characterized by exclusionary and even racist values (Kaufmann and Zimmer 
2004). 
 Theorists such as Schnapper (1998) have utilized the ethnic-civic dichotomy model to 
argue for the importance of separating civic structures from ethnic allegiances. She attempts 
to dissociate nation from ethnicity in order to give a “civic” framework to the state’s 
democratic practices. She argues that citizenship, as the active participation of individuals in 
political life, cannot exist without a community that integrates citizens into a whole. She 
proposes that this community be constructed through civic education, which must constantly 
redraw and reinforce the boundary between nationalism and patriotism. For Schnapper, 
national belonging does not contradict the universal, but is actually necessary for its 
realization.  
Balibar (2004) takes issue with Schnapper’s recommendation for “non-discriminatory 
discrimination,” arguing that nationalism is deeply tied to a process of othering and political 
exclusion. Critiquing universalism’s racist manifestations, which serve as the foundation of 
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civic nationalism, Balibar and Singh (2005) explain how these supposedly neutral structures 
of inclusion are actually filled with exclusionary content. Balibar highlights universalism’s 
roots in the national bourgeois revolutions and the ways that colonialism was justified 
through supposedly “universalist” ideals. Singh makes a similar argument, demonstrating 
how the United States is often upheld as one of the purer, more egalitarian forms of civic 
nationalism, when in actuality, white supremacy is deeply integrated into American “civic” 
nationalism to sustain a system of racial domination. Rather than see civic nationalism as an 
“empty abstraction,” Singh argues that, like all forms of nationalism, civic nationalism is the 
product of specific cultural narratives, customs, and histories.  
Other scholars are similarly critical of the supposed distinction between ethnic and 
civic nationalism. As McCrone (1998) suggests, the civic/ethnic distinction “does lend itself 
to an ethnocentric caricature – why can’t they be more like us?” (p. 9). McCrone goes on to 
assert that racism and war are no less frequent in “civic” societies than “ethnic” ones, a claim 
that is supported by several case studies, such as Kreuzer (2006), who argues that the ethnic 
nationalism that arose in Malaysia turned out to be more tolerant and inclusive than the civic 
nationalism that exists in Indonesia. Similarly, Herzfeld (1992) maintains that so-called civic 
societies maintain an equal level of symbolic meaning and are no more rational than 
“ethnic/traditional” societies. May (2008) builds on this notion, suggesting that civic or 
modern societies only appear “un-ethnic” because the symbolic bases of civic societies have 
been labeled as civic values and traditions. As May explains, “In effect, the ethnic interests of 
the majority group are legitimated and naturalized as civic ones which, in turn, are equated 
directly with modernity” (p. 53).  
There is no doubt that these scholars are correct in identifying the often more violent 
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and racist nature of “civic” societies, as well as the significant level of symbolism and 
religion in civic nationalism. However, other theorists maintain that ethnically-based and 
civically-based nationalisms are nonetheless rooted in two separate ideologies that facilitate 
distinct levels of intranational exclusion. As Smith (1999) explains, ethnic nationalism is 
specifically related to a common ancestry that one cannot genuinely escape or adopt, a 
restriction that Said (1998) reflects upon in regards to Palestinians’ relationship to Israeli 
nationalism: 
Palestine has been replaced by an Israel whose aggressive sense of itself as the state 
of the Jewish people fuels the exclusivity of a national identity won and maintained to 
a great extent at our expense. We are not Jews, we have no place there except as 
resident aliens, we are outsiders. (p. 34) 
 
This exclusionary basis of national belonging is distinct from civic nationalism, where the 
nation, if at least superficially, is sustained by ideological premises that are open to 
individuals of varied ancestries. Michael Ignatieff (1993) summarizes, “Ethnic nationalism 
claims, by contrast, that an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is 
the national community that defines the individual, not the individuals who define the 
national community” (pp. 7-8).  
Jewish/Israeli nationalism’s unique combination of both overt ethnic political 
dominance and a superficial commitment to civic ideals makes a compelling case for the 
application of the civic-ethnic paradigm, if only to explore its limits. While I have no interest 
in defending so-called civic nations like the United States as more responsive to the lives of 
ethnic minorities, I maintain that the ethnic-civic distinction is nonetheless helpful in 
identifying some of the particularly destructive manifestations of Jewish/Israeli national 
identity. By understanding the ethnic-civic distinction not as a marker of Western superiority 
to be used for international comparison, but as an analytical device to name and evaluate 
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certain nationalist currents within Israeli society, we can appreciate it as a clarifying 
mechanism to illuminate the particularly obdurate elements of Jewish national identity that 
continue to stifle Palestinian liberation.  
Unlike other forms of civic nationalism whereby the state’s citizens determine the 
nature of the state, Jewish nationalism openly deviates from this approach as it is outwardly 
and extra-territorially defined to perpetuate the growth and power (within Israel) of an 
ethnic/religious group. Though uncommon, this type of bloodline nationalism is not unique 
to Israel; it is found in other countries, for example, Korea (Shin 2006). Though it openly 
defines itself as a state of and for the Jewish people, Israel simultaneously expresses a 
rhetorical commitment to traditionally civic ideals, as seen in its official (though minimally 
implemented) adoption of both Hebrew and Arabic as national languages, as well as its 
democratic electoral system (though democratic rights are precarious for citizens who do not 
endorse the idea of Israel as the state of the Jews). In terms of political representation, Israeli 
democracy vis-à-vis its non-Jewish citizens could be compared to American democracy for 
Black citizens during the Jim Crow era. In the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians are stateless 
subjects of Israeli occupation, and are subjected to an entirely separate and unrepresentative 
legal system. However, Jewish Israeli settlers who live in the West Bank carry with them 
their civic rights as citizens. 
Rather than define Zionism as purely ethnic or civic, Uri Ram (2000) and Ilan Pappe 
(2000) conclude that both forms of nationalism exist within Israeli society, but that they are 
each particular to separate segments of the population. Ram and Pappe maintain that the 
traditional Zionist account is plagued by an unsolvable contradiction of ethnic and civic 
values, and thus is destined to morph into either exclusionist, ethnic neo-Zionism or civic, 
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democratic post-Zionism. The neo-Zionist solution favors the preservation of Israel’s ethno-
religious Jewish character in place of its democratic practices. In contrast, post-Zionism 
supports Israel’s relinquishing of its commitment to a “Jewish state” in favor of a civic 
democracy (Ram 2000). 
 
1.2.2 Jewish Nationalism in the Diaspora 
Because non-Israeli Jews were not born in Israel and do not (yet) possess Israeli 
citizenship, any purely civic understanding of Jewish nationalism by definition excludes 
them. As a result, non-Israeli Jews’ ability to identify with Jewish nationalism is theoretically 
limited to a neo-Zionist or ethnic nationalist emphasis on religious and cultural symbols, 
rather than a post-Zionist focus on citizenship and territoriality. Despite this, a growing 
number of non-Israeli Jews are beginning to identify with post- and anti-Zionist strands of 
thought (Alexander and Bogdanor 2006). Among Jews under 30 especially, scholars have 
noted a recent shift in Jews’ relationship to Israel and Zionism. As Sasson (2010) suggests, 
diaspora Jews are developing increasingly complicated relationships to the Israeli state 
compared to earlier generations of Jews who espoused unequivocal support for Israel. The 
2013 PEW study on Jewish Americans provides further evidence for such a generational 
shift, as young Jews appear to be diverging from dominant perspectives on Israel that 
privilege Israeli security concerns over Palestinians’ rights. For example, the majority of 
respondents over 65 reported that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish 
identity, while only one-third of respondents under 30 made the same claim. In addition, 
while 45 percent of respondents over 65 felt that the Israeli government was making a sincere 
effort to reach a peace agreement, only 26 percent of respondents under 30 agreed.  
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Sasson (2010) argues that this more critical stance of young North American Jews 
towards Zionism is not indicative of their alienation from Israel. Instead, he maintains that 
this rising criticism represents American Jews’ heightened sense of concern for it, in that 
Jews now care enough about Israel to try to influence it through direct engagement. A 
number of scholars of Jewish identity have fiercely debated Sasson’s conclusion, claiming 
instead that young Jews are becoming more detached from Israel and their Jewish identity 
(Kotler-Berkowitz & Ament 2010). Despite these contrasting interpretations, it is clear that 
this younger generation of Jews is more willing to criticize and openly contest Israeli policies 
and Zionism than their parents’ and grandparents’ generations. This change opens up space 
for a variety of political movements to recruit Jewish activists in order to strengthen their 
efforts to secure Palestinian rights and an end to the Israeli occupation. Alternative tours to 
Israel/Palestine are one of the many ways that such movements are attempting to change the 
conversation on Israel/Palestine in Jewish communities and garner greater support for a just 
peace in the region.  
 
 
1.3 TOURISM 
 
Tourism offers a particularly revealing lens to examine the changing relationship 
between transnational identities and the nation-state. As the world becomes more globalized 
and migration increases, understanding transnational identities, territoriality, and diaspora is 
crucial to conceptualizing avenues for global social change. Tourism is also an intellectually 
powerful framework to investigate diaspora identities because it prioritizes the significance 
of constructed meaning through the consumption of space (Kelner 2010). It therefore offers 
an important site to examine the intersection of territorially defined nations and symbolically 
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constructed notions of belonging and peoplehood.  
Beyond tourism’s theoretical relevance to understanding transnational identities, it 
represents a major economic and socio-political development. Tourism constitutes the largest 
international movement of people of all time, and it causes extreme cultural shifts, as 
developing countries are compelled to restructure their economies in order to maximize their 
profitability as tourist destinations (Eadington & Smith 1992; Kelner 2010; Urry 2011). With 
these major global ramifications in mind, tourism should not be studied as a peripheral 
element of social life or seen merely as a form of leisurely consumption. Instead, sociologists 
should prioritize tourism in their research as one of the fastest growing and most globally 
transformative processes of social life today. 
 
 
1.3.1 Authenticity and Performance  
Tourism acts as a double-edged sword in that it can enable cross-cultural 
understanding and cooperation, and yet, it can also be destructive and oppressive for local 
communities (Kincaid 1988). As the largest industry in the world (Urry 2011), it provides a 
rapidly expanding terrain to study the causes and conditions of global disparities. Early 
sociological studies of tourism focused primarily on representations of authenticity (as a 
contrast to modernity) sought by Western tourists (MacCannel1 1999, Pearce and Moscardo 
1996). In this strand of thought, tourism is conceptualized as a form of escape and discovery 
that allows privileged individuals to consume “authentic” (i.e. non-modernized) forms of life 
and culture.  
Numerous scholars have theorized the meaning of authenticity, offering various 
categorizations, such as “objective (object)” authenticity (Reisinger & Steiner, 2006), 
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“constructed” authenticity (E. Cohen, 1988; Olsen, 2002; Cook, 2010) and “subjective 
(existential)” authenticity (Cary, 2004; Steiner & Reisinger, 2006; Cook 2010). More 
recently, theorists have shifted towards conceptualizing authenticity as a process rather than a 
descriptive category (Cohen and Cohen 2012). In addition, with the rise of post-modernist 
thought, many scholars have dismissed the theoretical relevancy of authenticity all together 
(Cohen and Cohen 2012).  
One of the most significant recent contributions to the sociology of tourism is Urry’s 
Tourist Gaze (2001). Urry employs Foucault’s (1973) notion of the “medical gaze” to 
describe the experiences of people working in the tourism industry and how their performing 
for the tourist gaze commodifies cultures and ultimately changes ethnic identities and 
customs. This approach to tourism represents an important shift away from a focus on the 
reasons why people travel to how tourism is shaped by power, and its oppressive effects on 
local populations. In his discussion of the tourist gaze, Urry explains that in order to 
maximize their financial gain, locals alter their behavior and presentations of themselves to 
reflect back tourists’ expectations of them. Urry’s analysis opens up space for critical 
discussions of tourism’s effects on local populations and its dependency on capitalist 
exploitation, while also making room for critiques of racialized and gendered power in tourist 
activities. 
 
1.3.2 Alternative Tourism 
While most forms of tourism operate with traditional business models, “alternative 
tourism” challenges a purely profit-based approach. Alternative tourism remains a vague 
concept, with multiple definitions of what actually constitutes it (Butler 1992 and Pearce 
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1992). Eadington and Smith (1992) define it as tourism that is “consistent with natural, social 
and community values and which allow[s] both hosts and guests to enjoy positive and 
worthwhile interactions and shared experiences” (p. 3). While multiple definitions exist, what 
unites all types of alternative tourism, whether environmental, ethnic, or religious, is that 
they have social or political aims, beyond simply making a profit.  
 Many alternative tours are organized by marginalized groups and social justice 
advocates who use tourism as a tool to raise awareness and encourage political activism. This 
type of tourism, often referred to as “justice tourism,” involves “a process which promotes a 
just form of travel between members of different communities. It seeks to achieve mutual 
understanding, solidarity and equality amongst participants” (Pearce 1992: 18). Justice 
tourism spans a wide range of regions and topics, such as environmental justice tours in Los 
Angeles, Occupy Wall Street’s educational tours of New York City, and organized trips to 
Chiapas in Mexico to learn about the Zapatistas. These types of programs aim to raise 
participants’ political consciousness, maintaining that increased political awareness and 
knowledge is necessary for effective political activism.  
In Palestine, justice tourism evolved as a response to the exclusion of Palestinians’ 
cultural and political realties from mainstream and for-profit “Holy Land” tours (Isaac 2009). 
While the alternative tourism movement is most closely aligned with Palestinian initiatives, 
Palestinian tours are not the only ones with political motives. As Cohen-Hattab (2004) notes, 
starting before the establishment of the Israeli state, both Jews and Palestinians have been 
consistently using tourism to promote their national agendas and battle for the “hearts and 
minds” of foreign visitors. 
In his discussion of external bystanders to atrocities, Cohen (2001) charges both 
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Israelis and Palestinians with promoting observer denial among tourists to support their own 
political narratives. On the Palestinian side, Cohen criticizes travelers to the OPT for only 
seeking information that reinforces their previous political positions. He claims that many of 
these tourists refuse to even visit Israeli communities and are completely blind to Israeli 
political culture. He goes on to accuse Palestinian activists and their sympathizers of being 
afraid to air their dirty laundry for fear that it might weaken their political cause.  
On the Israeli side, Cohen lambasts Jewish-American tourists who are critical of 
human rights abuses in other parts of the world, but justify the suffering of Palestinians by 
adhering to a problematic narrative of Jewish victimhood. Cohen explains how Israeli guides 
play on stereotypes of American Jews as weak and passive, by allowing them to identify with 
the “tough Jew” persona of the Israeli soldier or settler (Breines 1990). In addition, guides 
exaggerate Israel’s “accomplishments” on gay and women’s rights to distract tourists from 
Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. Butler explains how this tactic, also known as “pink-
washing,” uses progressive causes such as sexual freedom to justify repressive immigration 
policies and wars on predominately Muslim populations (2009). Together these strategies 
promote what Cohen calls “cultural denial” (2001). Tourists begin to understand Israel 
through a specific cultural framework that makes it difficult for them to reconcile Israel’s 
actions with the country’s supposed moral status. This allows tourists to deny Israeli acts of 
violence and oppression, since they judge the validity of such acts through a carefully 
constructed lens of Israel’s ethical superiority. Alternative political tours, such as 
Walls2Windows, seek to undo some of this strategic representation by confronting tourists 
with sites and voices that vigorously contradict the narrative of Israel’s moral superiority. 
Another concept that can overlap with “justice tourism” is “thana-tourism” or “dark 
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tourism” (Stone and Sharpley 2008). Thana-tourism involves travel to places that are 
associated with suffering or death, such as graveyards (Seaton 2002), Holocaust memorials 
(Beech 2000), or slavery-heritage tours (Dann and Seaton 2001). Dann (1998) identifies 
several motives for participation in dark tourism, including fear of ghosts, search for novelty, 
nostalgia, celebration of deviance, and seeking feelings of a heightened sense of humanity. 
While definitely not all justice tourism is necessarily thana-tourism, in the case of 
Israel/Palestine, political tourism to the OPT often focuses on sites of tragedy and instances 
of violence and suffering to mobilize political support through empathy with the Palestinian 
plight.   
 
1.3.3 Diaspora and Tourism  
This study focuses on a unique form of tourism that combines justice tourism with 
another type of alternative tourism known as diaspora or homeland tourism. While in most 
tourism, the objects of the tourist gaze represent “the other” for tour participants (Morinis 
1992), in homeland or diaspora tourism, objects of the tourist gaze operate instead as 
signifiers of the self (Kelner 2010). In this way, diaspora tourism serves as a mechanism for 
tourists to gain greater insight into their own identities and culture, rather than as an 
opportunity to look upon foreign populations to experience difference.  
Returning to Cohen’s (2001) discussion of tourism in Israel and Palestine, the focus 
of this study is on neither traditional Palestinian solidarity tourism nor mainstream Jewish 
Zionist tourism. Instead, I look at an emerging type of tourism that provides ordinary Jewish 
tourists to Israel with the opportunity to travel to the OPT for a tour that more closely aligns 
with a Palestinian solidarity tour. In this way, these tours place participants, who were 
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previously shielded from Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, in the position of a bystander, 
where they are confronted with evidence of Israel’s aggression that contradicts their 
previously held beliefs. Alternative Jewish tours therefore combine both justice tourism and 
diaspora tourism, in that they engage with the specific allegiances and nationalist sentiments 
of Jewish tourists in order to promote political reflection and a greater concern for justice in 
the region.    
For many diaspora populations, tourism is largely associated with familial and 
business commitments. Members of diaspora groups travel to their home countries to visit 
family or to utilize their language and cultural knowledge for economic purposes (Coles and 
Timothy 2004). Other forms of diaspora tourism however are more organized and involve 
strategic political interests on the part of the home country and diaspora institutions. Kelner 
(2010) explains that diaspora institutions increasingly recognize the power of tourism as an 
effective medium to construct transnational community through political socialization. In 
addition to Jewish tourism to Israel, other countries such as China, Ireland, Scotland, India, 
and Pakistan are employing tourist initiatives to strengthen ties with their diaspora 
communities. For example, Bruner (1996) explains how many African-Americans travel to 
Ghana to discover their roots and visit sites that represent the struggles of their ancestors 
during slavery.  
Jewish tourism to Israel is a compelling example of political “homeland” or diaspora 
tourism because such tours often operate with the explicit goal to solidify Jewish ethno-
national identities and to elicit political and financial support. As Chazan and Saxe (2008) 
note, tourism has become a primary tool in Jewish education to address the perceived threat 
of assimilation. While there is ample research on Jewish travel to Israel, dating back to the 
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1960s, most of this research has taken a marketing approach and failed to seriously engage 
with broader academic discussions of ethnic and nationalist tourism (Kelner 2010). For this 
reason, further sociological research is necessary to investigate the processes of identity 
construction and political socialization that underlie Jewish tourism to Israel. 
A large number of such studies on Jewish tourism to Israel focus on Birthright, a free 
10-day tour for Jewish young adults that promotes Jewish peoplehood and a connection to 
the state of Israel (Chazan and Saxe 2008). To date, over 400,000 people, primarily from 
North America, have traveled to Israel as a part of the Birthright program. Anyone with 
immediate Jewish lineage between the ages of 18 and 26 is eligible to go on a Birthright trip, 
provided they have not lived in Israel during their adult lives or participated in a Jewish peer 
program in Israel. Over the course of ten days, participants are bused to all of the major 
Israeli cities and historical sites, where they engage in bonding exercises that serve to 
strengthen their connection to each other, to Israelis, and to the Jewish people. For example, 
according to one interviewee, after spending the day at Yad VaShem, the Israeli Holocaust 
museum, his Birthright group immediately traveled to a graveyard for Israeli soldiers to sit in 
a circle and discuss the need for a Jewish state and ethnic solidarity.  
Researchers report that Birthright participants have a stronger Jewish identity, 
relationship to Israel, and connection to the Jewish people than Jews of the same 
demographic who have never been on a Birthright program (Saxe 2004, Saxe 2012, Kelner 
2010). A 2004 longitudinal study on Birthright participants’ attitudes shows that these 
sentiments persist over several years. While Birthright’s official aim is to strengthen Jewish 
identity and fight assimilation, studies demonstrate that the most salient impact of the 
Birthright program relates to participants’ relationship to Israel. In their study of Birthright 
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participants, Saxe et. al (2004) found that nine out of ten participants professed a desire to 
return to Israel in the next two years. In addition, Birthright participants reported that they 
felt a stronger connection to Israel than non-Birthright participants, and that they felt more 
capable of explaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These findings suggest that while 
Birthright may claim to focus on religious and cultural aspects of Judaism, it largely 
functions to solidify nationalistic diaspora ties and support for the Israeli state among 
diaspora Jews.  
While such studies point towards Birthright’s strong influence on participants’ 
identities, one could easily suspect that those with a preexisting connection to Israel and 
Judaism would be more likely to attend a Birthright trip than other Jews. As result, it is 
methodologically problematic to attribute the higher levels of attachment to Israel and 
confidence in explaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict solely to participation in a Birthright 
trip. My research addresses this issue of sampling bias by analyzing the attitudes of the same 
participants before and after their tour, rather than comparing them to respondents who have 
never been on a tour. In this way I can make a stronger case for causality in the quantitative 
aspects of my research than previous studies of Jewish tourism to Israel. 
In addition, my research employs qualitative methods such as those found in Shaul 
Kelner’s book, Tours that Bind. Kelner’s ethnographic data detail the profound emotional 
experiences and ideological shifts that Birthright participants report. He quotes a number of 
participants who claim that the trip changed their lives and allowed them to “find 
themselves.” For example: “I know it sounds cliché, but the truth is that this trip changed my 
life…I now realize that the foundation of Israel is the foundation of the Jewish people.” Or, 
“Being in Israel has truly changed my life. It has changed the way I see myself and the 
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context in which I fit into every aspect of my life…I have never been more proud to be part 
of something in my life.” And also, “It was simply incredible – the best thing I’ve done in my 
entire life and I will be eternally grateful. It gave me a passion and a meaning to live and has 
literally changed my life.” (Kelner 2010: 187). The intensity of these quotes demonstrates 
that Birthright is profoundly successful in affecting the emotions and shaping the identities of 
some of its participants, further exemplifying the power of diaspora tourism. 
While it is clear that some participants respond to Birthright with intense shifts in 
their identities and political views, Taylor, Levi, and Dinovitzer (2012) demonstrate that 
these reactions are often rooted in heightened states of ambivalence, rather than pure, 
primordialist understandings of identity. By evoking participants’ emotions and ideological 
uncertainties, Birthright instills a complicated sense of collective identity that goes beyond a 
romanticized relationship to Israel. As they explain, “collective identity is forged in these 
trips precisely because they engage and mobilize competing sets of emotions from 
participants, who experience dimensions of closeness and distance at once” (p. 69). Taylor 
Levi, and Dinovitzer reveal the complex ways that programs like Birthright influence Jewish-
Americans’ identity construction and senses of national belonging. They explain that it is 
sometimes Birthright participants’ troubled feelings of distance and rejection from Israel that 
actually cause them to affirm their commitments to “work for” the Jewish state.   
In the last decade, more Jews have been participating in “alternative Jewish tourism,” 
which challenges Birthright’s agenda by deliberately engaging with the Palestinian national 
narrative (Aviv 2011). Thus far, Aviv’s 2011 article, “The Emergence of Alternative Jewish 
Tourism,” is the only research that has been conducted on these tours. While Stein’s (2008) 
Itineraries in Conflict also examines the relationship between Jewish travel to Palestinian 
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spaces and national identity, her work focuses on leisure and consumption-based tourism. In 
contrast to this form of pleasure-based travel, alternative Jewish tourism actively pursues 
emotional discomfort and unpleasant experiences that are meant to provoke deeper processes 
of political reflection. 
These alternative tours represent an extreme departure from traditional Jewish 
tourism to Israel in that they explicitly seek to complicate rather than validate participants’ 
diaspora national ties. While Birthright tours may unintentionally complicate participants’ 
Zionist identities, alternative tours are explicitly designed to challenge them. According to 
Aviv, such tours prompt difficult conversations about power, challenge traditional national-
historical narratives, and promote dialogue and reconciliation between Jews and Palestinians 
through people-to-people interactions. She describes how the content of these tours 
destabilizes myths, challenges the foundation of Jewish nationalist assumptions, and engages 
with repressed information and perspectives (Aviv 2011).  
While Aviv’s analysis is helpful in terms of identifying the ideological content and 
strategic approach of these tours, her research does not measure the tours’ impact on 
participants. Aviv identifies the tours’ goals, but she stops short of demonstrating whether or 
not they are effective in achieving them. While the emergence of such alternative tourism is 
fascinating in itself, it is important to understand how participants respond to this purportedly 
ideologically disruptive experience.  
By asking how these tours influence participants’ identities and political allegiances, 
my research is the first systematic study of the effects of these political tours, filling a gap in 
the literature on Jewish tourism to Israel. Specifically, I investigate how these tours impact 
participants’ national identities and political views. Do the tours complicate participants’ 
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Zionism and cause them to adopt more critical attitudes towards the base state (Israel)? If so, 
how do participants reconcile this criticism with their diaspora nationalism? I also evaluate 
how tourists’ newfound political dissent and nationalism shapes their activism on 
Israel/Palestine. These questions allow me to contribute to the broader topic of tourism’s role 
in generating criticism of exclusionary national narratives among diaspora populations. In 
addition, they shed light on larger questions of the relationship between national identity and 
political dissent, specifically, the supposed link between one’s level of identification with the 
base state and their willingness to criticize it. 
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2. METHODS 
To determine the effects of these alternative tours, I combine quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies to provide a thorough investigation of tour participants’ identities 
and reactions to the tour experience. I base my analysis on two data sources: 105 before and 
after tour surveys that include both quantitative and qualitative data, and 15 in-depth 
interviews with former tour participants.  
I focus on a case study of a tour program called Walls2Windows, which I founded 
while living in Israel and the OPT. Walls2Windows brings primarily North American Jews to 
the West Bank in order to expose them to the Israeli military occupation and to provide a 
platform for Palestinian voices to reach Jewish-Americans. Every day I would watch form 
my office in Tel Aviv as tour group after tour group of young American Jews would travel 
throughout Israel on Birthright without ever meeting a single Palestinian or stepping foot in 
the OPT. It frustrated me that these otherwise open-minded and critical young students were 
only hearing one side of the story. I believed that if Birthright participants had the 
opportunity to talk to Palestinians and to see the occupation for themselves, they would be 
more likely to question Birthright’s version of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Participants for the Walls2Windows tour are recruited within Israel primarily through 
contact with Jewish organizations such as Birthright, MASA, and study abroad programs at 
Israeli universities. The goal is to offer these Jewish tourists an opportunity to experientially 
engage with the Palestinian perspective by providing evidence of the logical and ethical 
flaws in traditional Zionist narratives through first-hand observation. By exposing 
participants to the harsh reality of life in the OPT, the tours seek to complicate participants’ 
perspectives on Israel through hearing from Palestinians who can attest to the human rights 
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violations that they experience living under occupation. The program has brought hundreds 
of young people to the West Bank, and is still in operation as of March 2015.  
The tour begins with an overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the guide 
uses maps and other visual aids to educate participants on the history of Zionism, the Nakba, 
and the various surges in violence between Israel and its adversaries. This introduction brings 
participants to the present day, where they are faced with the failure of Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks, and continued dispossession and occupation of Palestinian land. Depending on 
the tour guide, the tour follows one of two itineraries.  
The first itinerary begins in East Jerusalem where participants are acquainted with 
Palestinian Jerusalemites’ precarious residency status and the lack of services and rights 
afforded to them despite living under total Israeli sovereignty. The tour participants walk 
from West Jerusalem to East Jerusalem in order to see the changing socio-economic 
conditions, as well as cultural changes such as dress and language. Once in East Jerusalem, 
participants catch a local Palestinian bus to Bethlehem, where they sit alongside Palestinian 
riders as they drive by a massive settlement. Participants are then dropped off in front of the 
main Bethlehem-Jerusalem checkpoint where they must show their passports to armed Israeli 
soldiers amidst barbed wire and metal detectors.  
Once through the checkpoint, participants witness the separation wall and then take a 
taxi to the main public square in Bethlehem. Next participants meet their Palestinian guides 
and join them for lunch at a local Falafel restaurant. After lunch, participants travel to one of 
the Bethlehem refugee camps, where a resident tells them about life in the camp. At this 
point participants are exposed to the severe poverty at the camp and historical/political 
visuals such as the original UN buildings as well as the fences and turnstiles used by the 
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Israeli army during the intifada. After the refugee camp, participants return to the separation 
wall to see the graffiti and hear about how the wall has impacted Palestinian life. Finally, 
participants travel back through the checkpoint and the tour ends in Jerusalem with a closing 
session that is sometimes joined by an Israeli anti-occupation activist.  
The second itinerary, which the majority of respondents from this study participated 
in, begins at the Central Bus Station in West Jerusalem where participants ride on a public 
Israeli bus to Hebron that is full of soldiers and settlers. The bus drops off participants inside 
of an Israeli settlement called Kiryat Arba. The group then travels by foot from the settlement 
alongside a road that leads to a Palestinian neighborhood. Though populated by Palestinians, 
this neighborhood is under full Israeli control, allowing participants to see how Palestinians 
are unable to drive along the road in front of their homes and are generally harassed by 
neighboring settlers. Next participants visit the old city of Hebron, where they reach a 
pedestrian walkway that is monitored by soldiers and divided by a barricade that separates 
the road into two, one side for Israelis, one for Palestinians. Participants then continue along 
Shuhada Street after having their passports checked by an Israeli soldier. Along Shuhada 
Street, participants witness the “ghost-town” like atmosphere, as Palestinian access to the 
street is denied, Palestinian businesses have been shut down, and many Palestinian homes 
have been evicted. After crossing through another checkpoint, participants walk through the 
Palestinian section of Hebron (H1) to see the contrast with the Israeli controlled area (H2), as 
well as to buy souvenirs and observe daily life. While in the market, participants walk 
underneath netting that catches trash and other objects thrown at Palestinians by settlers who 
live above their shops. Soldiers maintain an intimidating presence throughout the tour, as 
they are constantly visible from guard towers and various checkpoints.    
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Participants then have lunch with a Palestinian family from Hebron, where they meet 
Mahmoud, a young Palestinian who studied abroad in the United States. After lunch, 
participants travel by bus to Bethlehem where they visit Aida refugee camp. Aida camp is 
located next to the separation wall between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Participants have the 
opportunity to approach the wall and photograph its impressive graffiti. In addition, 
participants meet another Palestinian family and learn about life in the refugee camp. The 
tour concludes with a closing session and a final journey through the Jerusalem-Bethlehem 
checkpoint, where participants are asked to show their IDs to armed soldiers.  
While working at Windows, my co-workers and I developed surveys in order to evaluate 
the success of our program. These surveys were distributed to tour participants immediately 
before and after the tour, and were offered to participants as opportunity for them to provide 
feedback to the tour organizers. The survey begins with four questions that ask participants 
how strongly they agree or disagree with each statement on a scale of one to five. The 
statements are:  
• It is important for those traveling to Israel to see Palestine 
• I expect that what I will learn today will change my opinion about 
Israel/Palestine 
• I have an informed and critical opinion about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
• It is dangerous to travel to the West Bank 
 
Participants are then asked: 
• Is this your first time in Israel/Palestine?  
• Have you ever participated in a Jewish heritage trip?  
• Did you plan to visit the West Bank before arriving in Israel? 
• What is the context of your current trip?  
• Are you here with a particular organization?  
• What three words come to mind when you think of Palestine? 
 
The exit survey repeats the first four questions and asks: 
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• Which parts of the tour were the most influential and why? 
• Did the tour change your perception of the conflict? 
• What parts of the tour were surprising and meaningful? 
• Did the things you saw and heard on the tour today conflict with things you 
previously thought about the conflict?  
 
Participants are also asked about their desire to engage further with Israel/Palestine, through 
three “yes” or “no” questions, which read:  
“Today’s tour caused me to want to:” 
• Be an active member of the initiative for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict 
• Seek more information 
• Return to the West Bank 
 
Analysis for this study focused on the questions of whether it is dangerous to travel to 
the West Bank, how important it is for those traveling to Israel to see Palestine, which part of 
the tour was most influential, and the final three questions on activism. For the first two 
questions, participants’ individual answers were recorded to determine a before and after 
effect. The average scores were calculated, as well as the average difference in scores 
between the pre-tour and post-tour surveys. For the question of which part of the tour was 
most influential, tour locations were ranked by those that received the highest number of 
participants who chose it as the most influential, to the place with the fewest number of 
participants who chose it. The three questions on activism were compared based upon the 
percentage of participants who marked yes for that particular outcome.   
In addition to this survey data of 105 respondents who attended the Walls2Windows 
tour, I conducted 15 in-depth interviews with former tour participants to more thoroughly 
address questions of meaning, identity, and biography. Potential participants were selected 
from the 105 survey respondents, using retroactive purposive/judgmental sampling 
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techniques (Berg and Lune 2012). Based upon respondents’ answers to survey questions, I 
selected for interviewees who are Jewish, were short-term tourists to Israel, and appeared to 
hold mainstream Zionist views on the conflict before attending the tour. Sampling for this 
demographic in my interviews allows me to better speak to issues of causality, in terms of 
attributing changes in participants’ opinions to the tours, and in order to compare my results 
with existing research on the effects of mainstream Jewish tours to Israel/Palestine. 
One of the drawbacks to this method is that participants may have approached the 
interviews with preconceived notions of the interviewer’s opinions. Since the interviewees 
knew that the interviewer was affiliated with the tour program and left-wing politics, 
interviewees may have tried to mirror the interviewer’s opinions or conceal their own views 
to maintain an amiable conversation. Alternatively participants may have been more 
aggressive or argumentative if they felt the need to convince the interviewer of their 
opinions. Either way, conversations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often involve an 
element of judgment and subsequent adjustment of how one presents his or her positions. 
Knowing ahead of time how the interviewees are likely to view the interviewer, and 
incorporating that knowledge into the analysis is arguably more effective than trying to 
maintain neutrality on such a divisive topic. 
 Another issue with the participants knowing that the interviewer is affiliated with the 
tour program is that they may have been superficially positive in their reactions to the tour, 
so as not to offend the interviewer by criticizing her work. In fact, there was a tendency 
among interviewees to be overly complimentary of the tour. However, such statements were 
generally insubstantial in content, with participants stating that they enjoyed the tour or that 
they thought it was well done. Such statements were not coded for analysis, as they did not 
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relate to changes in political views or identities. In addition, only about half the tours were 
led by the researcher, and there was no discernable difference in feedback between 
interviewees who attended the tours led by the researcher and those who attended the tours 
led by a different guide. 
Similarly, the tour surveys used for this study were not distributed by a neutral third 
party, but were completed by participants knowing that they were providing feedback for the 
tour organizers. Again, the issue of inaccurate positive responses, or telling the organizers 
“what they wanted to hear,” is a concern, though not a major one, as most of these statements 
were not used for analysis since they did not contain information about participants’ 
identities and political views. In addition, despite the drawbacks of this method, using 
surveys and interviewees from the interviewer’s own work allowed for a valuable level of 
control, access, and detailed knowledge of the tour programs, that may have been 
unattainable if the interviewer were to try to study participants on an external tour program. 
Working from within provided an exceptional degree of access to the tour participants, the 
time and freedom to determine the nature of her interaction with the research subjects, as 
well as detailed knowledge of the tour’s goals, content, and inner-workings. 
Participants were recruited through email with a personalized invitation to participate 
in an interview. Invitations were sent to former tour participants who indicated that they 
would like to be contacted in the future. The sample of interviewees for this study consisted 
of six men and nine women. Participants ranged in age from 22 to 30, and all participants 
lived in the United States for most of their lives, except for one participant from Argentina. 
Three participants held Israeli citizenship, although one obtained it after the Walls2Windows 
tour. The majority of participants identified as Ashkenazi (white) Jews, with two participants 
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of mixed Ashkenazi-Mizrahi (Jewish-Arab) identity, and one Sephardic. All participants 
were currently enrolled in or had completed higher education. Demographic data was 
collected through a written, open-ended survey. 
 
Table 1. Demographic Information on Interviewees 
 
Name Age Gender Region Highest 
Degree 
Obtained 
Religion2 Race Israeli 
Citizen 
Ethnicity 
Anna 28 Female East Coast MA Conservative White No Ashkenazi 
Mark 25 Male East Coast BA Mixed: 
Reform 
Judaism and 
Protestant 
Christianity   
Caucasian No --- 
Fernando 25 Male Argentina BA Liberal Jew Caucasian No Ashkenazi 
/Sephardic 
Caroline 26 Female East Coast BA Just Jewish White No Ashkenazi 
Lisa 26 Female East Coast BA Reform White No Ashkenazi 
Rachel 30 Female East Coast JD Reform White No Ashkenazi 
Eddie 26 Male East Coast BA Secular/ 
Atheist 
White/ 
Middle 
Eastern 
Yes Ashkenazi 
/Mizrahi 
Jamie 24 Female West 
Coast 
MA Reform White No Ashkenazi 
Benji 30 Male Midwest/
East Coast 
DSc Jewish White3 After 
Tour 
Ashkenazi 
Bryce 23 Male West 
Coast 
BA Reform White No Ashkenazi 
Louis 26 Male Midwest BA Reform White No Sephardic 
Maggie 26 Female South MA Reform White No Ashkenazi 
Sasha 22 Female East Coast BA  Conservative Caucasian No Ashkenazi 
Emma 25 Female East Coast MA Not religious Caucasian No Ashkenazi 
Daisy 24 Female South MS Secular Jewish Yes Ashkenazi 
/Mizrahi 
* Responses were obtained from an open-ended survey that each participant filled out using their own words 
 
 
Interviews were held over Skype and ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours. These 
interviews allowed for greater exploration of the tour’s lasting effects, as interviews took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 All interviewees were considered “Jewish” by Birthright’s standards of having at least one Jewish parent. 
Some participants identified with certain sects of Judaism: Reform Judaism is typically the most liberal form of 
Judaism, followed by Conservative Judaism, and then Orthodox Judaism.  
3 Benji replied to the question about race with “???” but appeared to be white 
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place two to three years after interviewees’ participation on the Walls2Windows tour. The 
conduct of the interviews was based on Burgess’s (1984) “conversation with a purpose” and 
covered four main topics, as agenda items for the interview: 
1. Participant’s experience on a mainstream Jewish heritage trip to Israel 
2. What the participant learned from the Walls2Windows tour 
3. Participant’s political views and activism 
4. Participant’s understanding of Jewish and Zionist identity and how it has changed 
 
I coded for themes that illuminated participants’ negotiations of their diaspora national 
identities and for moments of change and questioning of participants’ political views. 
Interviewees were classified by two categories, one on national identity (Zionism), which 
was determined using a six-degree scale4, and another on participants’ level of criticism 
towards the state of Israel and its policies. To measure participants’ level of criticism, 
interviewees were ranked on a scale of one to six, with one representing the most critical, 
“dissenting” views and six representing the most “supportive” views.  In addition, 
participants were divided into two categories. Those labeled as “dissenters,” voiced criticism 
of the Israeli state, solidarity with Palestinians, and opposition to the occupation. In contrast, 
“supportive” participants praised the Israeli military, showed involvement in Israel advocacy 
programs, and defended Israeli policies and actions. Participants were also categorized into 
Zionists and non-Zionists, in order to identify patterns between participants’ levels of 
Zionism versus their political positions, and to explore the contradictory relationship between 
diaspora national belonging and political criticism of the base state. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 1= Enthusiastically anti-Zionist, 2= Not Zionist, 3= Not Zionist but supports a Jewish state, 4= 
Zionist but hesitant to identify as such, 5= Zionist but somewhat critical of Zionism, 6= 
Enthusiastically Zionist 
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3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
3.1 NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL DISSENT  
 
Despite the demographic homogeneity of the tour participants, each articulated a 
distinct relationship to Israel, Judaism, and Zionism. Roughly half of the interviewees 
identified as Zionist, while others did not but supported a Jewish state, and some were 
definitively anti-Zionist. While this range in Zionist identification is interesting in itself, what 
is perhaps even more striking is the counter-intuitive association between participants’ 
identifications as Zionist and the intensity of their criticism of Israeli policies. 
 Every participant voiced some degree of criticism in regards to what they witnessed 
on the tour, ranging from those who directed their criticism towards radical settlers, like 
Daisy, who said, “like the amount of hatred I had towards them [the settlers], I can’t explain 
it…I think that was my biggest learning experience from going on the Windows tour,” to 
those who offered a systematic critique of the Israeli state, such as Anna: 
Now that I’m exposed, I think Israel should exist, but I think there are a lot of 
problems with the way the government is run and the way that they treat minorities 
and the fact that they don’t really have a constitution and they don’t protect 
everyone’s rights, some of it is not the government, some of it is individual behavior, 
but I don’t think the government does enough to stop that behavior.  
 
 Although all participants voiced a critical perspective on the situation after the tour, there 
was a distinct contrast between those participants who, in general, supported the Israeli state 
and its institutions (particularly the military) but criticized radical segments of the 
population, and those who directly criticized Israeli policies and the country as a whole. 
Those who reserved their criticism for radical segments of the population are referred to as 
“supporters,” while those who voiced wider criticism of the state and its institutions are 
called “dissenters.” 
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One would assume that self-identified Zionists, who believe in the importance of a 
Jewish state, would generally make up the same group of people who most ardently support 
Israeli policies. Likewise, one would expect that those participants who reject Jewish 
nationalism would also be those participants who articulate the harshest criticism towards 
Israel. Instead, the results of this study show an unsteady, and at times, contradictory 
relationship between participants’ identification as Zionist and their support for Israel. The 
following chart plots each participant, starting with the most critical participant and ending 
with the least critical participant. One can see that the Zionist identity (how enthusiastically 
she or he accepted or rejected Zionism) of each participant does not consistently correlate 
with his or her level of criticism towards the Israeli state. Many of the more critical 
participants were some of the most Zionist; just as many of the least Zionist participants were 
among the strongest supporters of Israel. 
Figure 1. Participants’ Identification with Zionism (Zionism) vs. Their Level of Support 
for the State of Israel (Support for Israel) 
  
*Levels of criticism towards Israel and Zionism were both measured on a scale of 1 to 6:  
1=least Zionist & 6=most Zionist, 1=least critical of Israel & 6=most supportive of Israel 
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3.1.1 Supporting the State without Nationalism 
 
The most dramatic difference in Zionism and politics can be seen towards the right 
end of the chart, where the most ardent supporters of Israel are plotted. Three of the 
participants with the most staunchly “supportive” politics were critical of Jewish nationalism 
and/or did not identify as a Zionist. For example, Mark, who stated, “I tend to side a little bit 
more pro-Israeli,” espoused corresponding views such as a preoccupation with anti-Israel, 
anti-Western indoctrination in Palestinian society and unequivocally labeling Hamas, a 
terrorist organization. In addition, while most participants expressed feelings of deep sadness 
and anger regarding the recent assault on Gaza5, Mark praised the Israeli army, commending 
their “restraint.” He also recounted the assault through a narrative that blamed Hamas for the 
violence, noting their role in firing rockets, breaking the cease-fire, and kidnapping the Israeli 
teenagers in the West Bank (claims that were subsequently proven to be false or misleading). 
However, when it came to the question of Zionism, Mark gave one of the most critical 
responses: 
I consider myself pro-Israeli; I don’t consider myself a Zionist. Like, I definitely 
support Israel, and I believe it definitely has an important place in this world and it’s 
a wonderful country and I don’t want to see the country go away … but at the same 
time, now it’s at the cost of someone else’s freedom and living too. 
 
Despite his stated support for Israel, Mark does not identify as a Zionist, and appears to 
associate the Jewish state with oppression. Mark’s relationship to Israel is characterized by 
political support of the state and its institutions, and simultaneous criticism of Israeli/Jewish 
nationalism. Unlike other participants, Mark showed little emotional wrestling with his 
Jewish identity as it relates to Israel, and did not appear to feel a personal connection to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In the summer of 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge, which killed over 2,200 people in Gaza, 
the majority of whom were civilians. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf 
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Zionism. Therefore, while Mark is exceptionally supportive of the Israeli state/military, he 
was one of the least Zionist participants on the tour. 
Benji is another participant who voiced clear “supportive” views, and simultaneously 
described his Zionism in relatively ambivalent terms. Initially, Benji was hesitant to say 
whether he identified as a Zionist. When asked if he identifies as a Zionist, he responded, “I 
think there are many forms of Zionism. I think that…wow it’s a very loaded question.” 
However, after circumventing a response, he explained that he does see himself as Zionist, 
but qualified it by referencing Palestinian nationalism. As he states, “my form of Zionism is 
we need a safe space for Jews because we are still under threat… but they [Palestinians] also 
need a safe space.” Although Benji eventually identifies as a Zionist, he appears cautious of 
the label and, like Mark, shows relative opposition to the term. For example, at one point he 
says that he tries to act as a “counterforce” to the idea that “Zionism is the right way and 
Jewish nationalism is the right way.”  
Like Mark, Benji espoused militant views against Palestinians and in support of the 
Israeli military, despite his relatively low enthusiasm about Zionism. He considers 
Palestinian fighters to be terrorists and is deeply bothered by what he sees as the Palestinian 
culture of “glorifying martyrdom, homicide bombers, and violence.” He also voices his 
support for the Israeli army, stating, “I also believe in the intelligence capacities of the IDF 
and the border patrol, and I have tremendous respect for them.” Later he added, “I also have 
an affinity for believing in the necessity of sometimes the brutality of the IDF.” While other 
interviewees sometimes expressed sympathy for individual soldiers, Benji and Mark were 
two of the only participants who supported the Israeli army as an institution. As such, it is 
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significant that the two participants who exhibited the strongest support for the Israeli 
military would also be among the minority of participants who contested Jewish nationalism.   
This seemingly contradictory way of thinking was also seen with Bryce, who was 
largely uncritical of the Israeli state and army, but simultaneously rejected Zionism. Rather 
than articulating clear positions like Mark and Benji, Bryce was hesitant to take any strong 
stances on the conflict. As he explains: 
I had a really interesting relationship with the conflict or at least the politics there…I 
kind of fell into a group of friends that were very much in AIPAC… and ended up 
doing an internship there… I think AIPAC has a certain rep of hard right, like 
conservative, both of which I disagree with …I just felt very much uninformed…so 
that was why I wanted to study abroad out there and it was in studying abroad that I 
really saw the value of my connection with Israel, not being to politics, but freedom 
of the religion. Um, and since then I’ve really softened my involvement… and 
definitely if I had to say I was aligned …like J Street probably speaks more to my 
kind of, my sense. 
 
Bryce was one of the only participants to refrain from voicing any criticism of the Israeli 
state, army, and even the settlers. Throughout the interview he avoided directly critiquing 
Israel, and made mostly neutral statements such as, “[the tour] provided me more of a lens or 
anecdotes to offer for conversation.” While Bryce did not articulate explicitly “supportive” 
positions, his internship at AIPAC and participation on a Hasbara trip, coupled with his lack 
of criticism towards Israel, speak to his general political positioning. Yet despite all of these 
indications of his general alignment with “supportive” politics, Bryce was perhaps the most 
unequivocally non-Zionist participant. When asked whether he identified as a Zionist, he 
replied: 
Bryce: Definitely not. Definitely not.  
 
Interviewer: And why not? 
 
Bryce: To me Zionism is a sense of returning…kind of returning to the lands… that’s 
not appealing to me. I think it’s important for me to know that there is a Jewish…a 
 	   45	  
place that, where Jews are welcomed and communities are built…I’m not sure if that 
place needs to be a state. I’m not sure if it should be a state, in fact. 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Pro-Palestinian Zionists 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, were the respondents who reported “dissenting” 
political views, but identified as Zionist and/or strongly supported the existence of a Jewish 
state. This group, the largest category among interviewees, included Anna, who explains, “I 
think that you should be able to say you’re a Zionist, but I’m also a Zionist who’s pro-
Palestinian, I think that you can’t say that (laughs), it seems contradictory to say that, but 
that’s basically how I am.” While Anna repeatedly emphasized her love for Israel, she also 
spoke harshly of the state, even claiming it was perpetrating “cultural genocide.” She also 
insisted that she would not give money to Israel, and would only donate to progressive, left-
wing NGOs, a significant stance considering the American Jewish tradition of donating 
money to Israel through nationalist organizations like the Jewish National Fund.  
Jamie also took a strong political stance against the Israeli state, while still speaking 
favorably of Zionism. Unlike Anna, Jamie did not identify as Zionist, however she expressed 
an underlying attachment to Jewish nationalism. For Jamie, her (non) Zionist identity seemed 
to hold great importance and was a source of ideological turmoil: 
Right off the bat I would say I’m not a Zionist. But like what does that really mean? I 
think we needed a place to go, it was such a hard time, there was no way we could 
have thought through what it would have looked like taking over [Palestine]. But I 
think the way that people are oppressing the Palestinians…that’s what really gets to 
me. And I think, you know, we need a Jewish state, I think going to the [Western] 
Wall is beautiful… it’s amazing what Jewish people have done in Israel and around 
the world. And I think Judaism is amazing. And so that’s why it’s so conflicting. 
 
Jamie expressed a deep love for Israel, despite her explicit opposition to the Israeli 
government. Statements such as, “I’m proud of Israel and what’s it done” and “I love Israel 
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like a home” can be contrasted with her unequivocally critical positions regarding Israel’s 
treatment of Palestinians. For example, in recounting an experience from Jewish summer 
camp in the US, she states, “I’ve heard probably a hundred times, the Israeli scouts saying, 
Israel doesn’t attack unless we’re provoked, over and over, and my feeling is that we are 
attacking the Palestinians every single day.” In addition, Jamie was the only participant to 
declare that she was uncomfortable with returning to Israel, because she would not want to 
support it financially: 
And to this day I will often say, I would totally live in Israel, except politically. And I 
miss it so much and I haven’t been back because where I am now, I don’t want to 
give my money to the Israeli government, because I don’t like what they’re doing 
with it or what they’re choosing not to do with it…I love it [Israel] like a home…and 
I think we [tour participants] all kind of had a narrative where we felt really really 
really torn…I’m getting upset thinking about it… I realized they [Palestinians] are so 
severely oppressed here, and so what are they really supposed to do. And that being 
said, there is a lot of guilt I feel for looking at Israel so critically. 
 
Relative to other participants, Jamie is considerably sympathetic to Zionism. Although she 
doesn’t identify as Zionist, she clearly maintains a deep emotional and ideological bond to 
Jewish nationalism. This can be contrasted with her dissenting politics, which became 
particularly evident when I asked how she would respond if someone asked if she was pro-
Israel. She replied, “I would say it’s really complicated and I would start having a 
conversation with them, but my first instinct is to say no.” This negative response can be 
compared with her response to the same question of being pro-Palestinian:  
Yeah! Kind of. I mean I would say yeah… I know logically there are probably some 
parts of the Palestinian narrative that I am making to be more idealistic…but I would 
say I feel more empathy to the Palestinian people. 
 
Participants like Jamie demonstrate the ideological difficulties of diaspora members who 
maintain highly emotional, nationalist sentiments towards a “base” country, while still 
espousing criticism of the state. 
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Several other interviewees expressed a similar affinity for Jewish nationalism, while 
simultaneously holding dissenting political views. For example, Emma, who stated explicitly, 
“I’m pro-Palestinian. I mean it is what it is. That’s what I am,” also voiced a relatively 
favorable view of Zionism, “I like that there’s a Jewish state…I like that there’s a place that 
they can go, especially Jews from the Middle East that were persecuted… Overall I think it’s 
a good thing.” 
Eddie was another Zionist-identified participant with critical views of Israel. For 
Eddie, reclaiming his Zionist identity appeared to allow him to maintain legitimacy amid his 
political dissent. When asked how traveling to the OPT affected his Zionism, he replied: 
It definitely made me question it. But I think that in questioning and then coming 
through that, it kind of made it [my Zionism] stronger …Coming to the realization of 
all the problems, and being able to think my way around them, and recognize what a 
Jewish state means to me, sort of made it stronger I guess, and sort of validated the 
fact that I can still call myself a Zionist, despite what I believe.  
 
Eddie seemed motivated to maintain his Zionist identity, despite holding opinions that he 
knew others might consider anti-Zionist. In addition, the quotation above reveals how 
questioning his identity, and experiencing tension with it, ultimately served to strengthen it. 
He elaborates:  
To me it [Zionism] means having a safe place for my people…who have not had a 
safe place in many or most places that they’ve been for a long time… to me it’s just 
…like any other sort of nationalism… Zionism comes down to the need for a Jewish 
state… so in my mind, Zionism doesn’t have to mean excluding anyone, it just sort of 
means, at least the Jewish people have like a safe and secure place… in my mind, 
even a bi-national state would still be a Jewish state … I just have an attachment to 
that word [Zionism] because I’m Israeli, because of the ideals that my family fought 
for, for so long, were… really noble ideals of what Zionism is.  
 
Some of the other participants with critical views towards Israel appeared to identify as 
Zionist out of social pressure or convention. As Sasha explains: 
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I never know what to call myself, I guess I’m a Zionist. But someone was telling me 
once it’s the way it works, that I’m a Zionist because such a country should exist. But 
I’m not always pro-Israel, like I am, but I don’t always agree with everything they do. 
 
Similarly Caroline states, “I nominally identify as like a Zionist left-wing person. Even 
though I’m not like die-hard Zionist. Like, I’m flexible. I don’t really know.” When I 
followed up by asking her whether a national Jewish identity is important to her, she said, “I 
don’t know. Like no, to me like Zionist…it’s so difficult…I think Israel has a right to exist 
but I don’t know like what Israel should be. … It’s really difficult.” Both Sasha and Caroline 
similarly wrestled with being one of the only “left-wing” people in extremely Zionist, Jewish 
environments. Sasha attends a predominately Jewish college on the East Coast, while 
Caroline works for an organization that runs Jewish education programs in Israel. Neither 
was particularly quick to identify as a Zionist, and both expressed hesitation in their answers. 
Additionally, both Sasha and Caroline alluded to how they are perceived and labeled by 
others, implying social pressure, and perhaps a sense of obligation to identify as Zionists. 
 
3.1.3 Not-so-blind Zionism 
The remaining six participants held views that “matched” their political positions, 
either as “dissenting” non-Zionists or “supportive” Zionists. Fernando and Daisy were the 
only two participants who clearly identified as Zionists and espoused decidedly supportive 
positions. Fernando said he “absolutely” identifies as a Zionist, and said that while he knows 
other people entered into a crisis over their Zionism after being exposed to the situation in 
Palestine, this was not the case for him. Daisy said she “definitely” identifies as a Zionist. 
After I asked her how the tour influenced her Zionist identity, she explained: 
I think it just made like my blind Zionism not so blind, and it’s kind of like more of a 
choice being Zionist. And understanding the parameters, or the conflicts around 
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saying that you’re a Zionist and what that entails, what it means supporting what’s 
going on, and it’s hard. Of course I can’t say that I full on support what’s going on in 
Hebron, but at the same time it’s like, if I’m Zionist I do, right? So, I don’t support it, 
but …your understanding of what it means to be a Zionist, or the difficulty of what it 
is to be a Zionist… it includes a lot of hardship and conflicts, and more than one 
people, and thought, so that definitely took me from like swimming in one direction, 
like “yeah Zionist!” to another more difficult route of Zionism. 
 
As Daisy reveals, even those who staunchly identify as pro-Israel and Zionist may find 
themselves wrestling with their relationship to Zionism after a tour to the West Bank. 
Therefore, while on the one hand, the high number of “Zionist” participants with critical 
views of Israel reveals the ability of “dissenting” diaspora members to maintain nationalist 
ties; on the other hand, the fact that all but one participant showed some ideological struggle 
with Zionism, if not a total dismissal of it, demonstrates that such tours certainly trouble 
diaspora national ties and can put them into crisis.  
 
3.2 ACTIVISM 
The final category includes non-Zionists with “dissenting” views. While there is nothing 
unusual about a correlation between non-Zionism and criticism of Israel, what was 
significant about the individuals in this category is that, overall, they exhibited the lowest 
levels of conventional activism in regards to Israel/Palestine. In addition, these participants 
also repeatedly referenced their own lack of knowledge on the issue. As Louis says, “I don’t 
think I’m arrogant enough to think that my ideas of how you can achieve peace in the Middle 
East would mean anything at all.” Maggie made similar comments such as, “I know there’s a 
lot that I just don’t understand. There’s so much I don’t think I will understand too.”  Like 
Louis and Maggie, Rachel also alluded to her lack of knowledge about the situation, but 
clearly opposed the idea of a Jewish state: 
 	   50	  
Having a country that’s based on having something called like a Jewish state… just 
didn’t fit in with my beliefs of how the world should function… I just never 
understood how that could be ok, how you could treat people, how a country that is 
going to treat people differently, treat them better because of their religion or 
ethnicity… I just don’t see any way how that could be ok. Even though I don’t have 
enough information to necessarily say why… that was just always the underlying 
feeling. 
 
This self-identification of interviewees’ own lack of knowledge possibly explains such 
participants lower levels of activism. Their political engagement after the tour usually 
amounted to a heightened interest in the region and a tendency to voice opinions in 
conversations about Israel/Palestine. As Maggie explains: 
I think more than anything, when I read articles now that mention Israel, something 
goes off, “am I getting one side? Like, ok it’s the Wall Street Journal, so I’m probably 
getting the Israeli side of this, “remember that.” That’s about it. 
 
Rachel, another “dissenting” non-Zionist explains that for geographical reasons, 
Israel/Palestine is not a major focus for her: 
If Israel was a place that I would have been staying longer… if it was a place I lived, I 
would want to be involved in more ways… but it very rarely comes up, I don’t have a 
lot of Jewish friends, so Israel is not a common topic. 
 
Unlike other participants who understood their relationship to Israel through the lens of 
transnational diaspora, Rachel felt unmotivated to act on account of her physical distance 
from Israel/Palestine. For participants with strong diaspora ties, not being physically located 
in Israel did not seem to affect their decision to become politically engaged.  
The only dissenting non-Zionist who demonstrated a relatively high level of 
engagement was Lisa, whose response to whether she identifies as a Zionist was 
uncharacteristic for an individual who supports BDS6, works with Palestinian organizations, 
and lives in the West Bank: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 BDS stands for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement against Israel 
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I really haven’t done any reading on Zionism or the origins of Zionism, I’ve just seen 
the results of Zionism … I can’t answer that as an informed answer…I really want to 
do some reading on it … I would definitely call myself an anti-Zionist because of 
that, but really not sure. 
 
Therefore while Lisa certainly qualifies as a “dissenting” non-Zionist, she shows a deeper 
level of reflection and sympathy for Jewish nationalism than other less engaged, non-Zionist 
dissenters. This suggests that there may be a link between one’s readiness to dismiss Zionism 
and their level of political engagement in the region. 
 
3.2.1 Who Counts as an Activist? 
Although Lisa did not identify as an activist, she showed a high level of political 
engagement. For example, when I asked if she was involved in anything surrounding the 
recent assault on Gaza, she replied: 
I’ve been desperate to get to a protest, or to have any, do anything, I’ve called, I’ve 
written letters to my senators, I’ve called, I’ve tried to engage people and have people 
send also to their senators, and yeah, I actually tomorrow am having a meeting with 
these women to organize a protest for Friday. 
 
Lisa’s hesitancy to identify as an activist shows that even those participants with very high 
levels of involvement do not see themselves as particularly active on this issue. When asked 
about his activism, Eddie exhibited a similar tendency. In the following quote, he elaborates 
on this, explaining that he does consider many of his activities to be political, even though 
others probably would: 
I think a lot of the things that I wouldn’t call political, other people would call 
political. I worked in education a lot in Israel … I worked at the peace camp… I 
coordinated some dialogue sessions in Ramle between the different communities, so I 
don’t consider that political, but I think a lot of people would consider that 
political…My thing is sort of, the more I can be visible as a Jewish person and as an 
Israeli person in the Muslim or Arab world, so that people can see that there are also 
Jews like me, there are also Israelis like me that speak Arabic that care about the 
community, that is a powerful thing. 
 	   52	  
 
Lisa and Eddie were not unique, as this type of self-criticism in terms of activism was 
evident among most interviewees, where participants’ standards for involvement were much 
higher than their actual activism. During the in-depth interviews, very few participants 
referred to themselves as activists in regards to Israel/Palestine. Nonetheless, despite not 
identifying as activists, every participant demonstrated some degree of political engagement, 
ranging from reading news articles on the conflict to founding a college organization 
committed to peace-building in Israel/Palestine. These findings are consistent with the tour 
surveys, which revealed that a majority of participants felt an increased desire to become 
involved in activism related to Israel/Palestine after participating on the tour.  
Among the 105 survey respondents, a large majority, 83% of participants, indicated 
that they would like to seek more information after the tour. As discussed in the methods 
section, this high percentage could be due in part to participants catering their answers to 
please the tour organizers. Yet even with this taken into consideration, this particularly high 
statistic strongly suggests that most participants intend to stay intellectually engaged with the 
conflict. 80% of participants stated they would like to return to the West Bank, which not 
only shows a desire to continue to interact with Palestinians, but also suggests a reduction in 
fears about traveling to the West Bank. As discussed in the next section, many participants 
entered the tour with deep-seated fears about traveling to the OPT, so the fact that 80% 
would like to return shows a significant change in participants’ attitudes towards travel in the 
OPT. Finally, 66% of survey respondents stated that the tour motivated them to be an active 
member in efforts for a just peace in Israel/Palestine. While being an active member may 
mean different things to different people, this percentage suggests that two in three 
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participants felt some desire to take action after going on the tour, and potentially saw 
themselves as agents of change in creating a more just and peaceful future.  
While almost all of the participants remained active in efforts for peace and justice, 
very few were interested in attending either the pro-Palestinian protests or the pro-Israel 
protests that took place during the 2014 war in Gaza. The following quotes demonstrate 
participants’ hesitations in identifying with either group of activists: 
Emma: The pro-Palestinian protests that I used to see in California, and California has 
a very sort of different anti-Israel feeling than the East Coast, as far as I’m concerned, 
they were having ridiculous signs that didn’t make me connect to the situation, they 
just made me think that they were crazy. Like they would say stop the Holocaust in 
Palestine. And once you start talking like that, then you really lose people, as opposed 
to actually having a real protest, a real conversation about what’s going on. So 
anything that’s too one-sided on either end …I can’t be involved with it because it’s 
doing the exact same thing as a pro-Zionist person would do, just pro-Palestinian.  
 
Caroline: I could never support like Hasbara, I wouldn’t. I’m very critical of the idea 
of the Israeli government and stuff but…I’m not gonna go to these like “If not now”7 
demonstrations either. I mean, like, I don’t know. The “If not now” thing is kind of 
interesting, just because, while I do feel like I practically could be one of them, I’m 
just like a hair away from being one of them, but I also just feel like their 
demonstrations have been really gimmicky and very like, PR driven. I don’t know 
maybe I’m just cynical. 
 
Sasha: I haven’t gone to any pro-Israel rallies in New York because it’s just so 
uncomfortable, not that I’m not pro-Israel, but these people are very hard-line, and I 
just, I can’t. I’ll be honest with you, like I feel weird, but I also wouldn’t go to the 
other things that are like free Palestine rallies, like I wouldn’t be going to those 
either… so I just wouldn’t even know which one to go to. 
 
Eddie: A lot of the pro-Palestinian groups out there, that I basically agree with on 
everything, also have either a lot of anti-Semitism or just like, little things that make 
me uncomfortable, that are not like huge, but that…I don’t feel like I can get on board 
with, even if I agree with almost everything that they stand for…. there’s sort of no 
awareness of….what it would mean for an Israeli or a Jewish person, you know, so 
certain things that, like one thing for me is like the apartheid thing, or just the idea of 
the Zionist movement being a colonial movement. You know that’s not malicious, 
and I’m sure it’s with good intentions, but I just feel like, that offends me. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “I Not Now” is a leftist movement of young American Jews that arose in response to the 2014 assault on Gaza: 
http://ifnot.net/ 
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Although many of the “dissenting” Zionists did not attend protests for either side, this is not 
to say that they were not engaged in efforts for peace in Israel/Palestine. After the tour, Sasha 
founded a peace organization on her right-wing campus, Emma interned with 
Walls2Windows, and Eddie continued to volunteer in Palestinian communities. 
In terms of participants who engaged in traditional forms of activism, Daisy, a 
“supportive” Zionist, was the only participant who attended a protest during the war: 
I’ve only gone to pro-Israel rallies… I’m active in the FIDF8 here, I plan on being 
active when I move, being part of the young leadership... I almost joined the [Israeli] 
army, but I didn’t because I’m selfish (laughs)…And active in the Palestinian aspect? 
More if I’m socializing with somebody and they have no idea, I definitely voice my 
opinions when it comes to the struggle, like some people just don’t know, and I’m 
sure you encounter them all the time, and you can’t stand it, so I definitely reveal as 
much of the hardships, that’s more I wouldn’t say it’s “activist,” but it’s on a more 
intimate basis.  
 
The fact that Daisy interpreted the question on activism to refer to both Israelis and 
Palestinians, suggests that she feels connected to both groups, with some desire to support 
Palestinians. Nonetheless, Daisy, along with other “supportive” participants, such as 
Fernando and Bryce, continued to work for mainstream Zionist causes, as seen with Daisy’s 
continued involvement in FIDF. Likewise, Fernando continued to head a group that worked 
to strengthen economic cooperation between Argentina and Israel (although he now brings 
group members to the West Bank when they travel to Israel). Bryce, who was scheduled to 
intern at AIPAC after going on the Walls2Windows tour, decided to continue with his 
internship (despite having reservations immediately after the tour). However, after the 
internship and in light of his experience with Walls2Windows, he now no longer identifies 
with AIPAC and positions himself closer to J-Street’s politics. Thus while the tour certainly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Friends of the IDF is a “pro-Israel” Zionist NGO that raises money to support Israeli soldiers 
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impacted “supportive” participants’ ideologies, it did not consistently cause them to abandon 
their involvement in mainstream, Zionist activism. 
 
3.3 HUMANIZATION AND EMPATHY 
3.3.1 Danger and Fear  
While the Walls2Windows tour may not have caused some participants to abandon 
their previous activities in support of Israel, this is not to say that such participants walked 
away from the tour unchanged. Before embarking on the tour, participants were asked to rate, 
on a scale of 1 to 5, how dangerous it is to travel to the West Bank. Before the trip, 
participants’ answers ranged from 1 to 5, with an average of 2.73, a mode of 3, and a median 
of 3. After the trip however, participants’ answers ranged from 1 to 4, with an average of 
2.28, a mode of 2, and a median of 2.  
 
Table 2. Survey Respondents’ Rankings of How Dangerous is the West Bank? 
 How Dangerous is the West 
Bank (Before the W2W Tour) 
How Dangerous is the West 
Bank (After the W2W Tour) 
Average Rating 2.73 2.28 
Median Rating 3 2 
Most Common Rating 3 2 
*All ratings were on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = not dangerous at all, to 5 = very dangerous 
 
These statistics show that, after participating on the tour, participants experienced a 
shift in their perceptions of the West Bank as dangerous. This suggests that stereotypes and 
fears are pervasive among tour participants, but that they can be reduced through actual 
experiences in the OPT and interaction with Palestinians. This finding complements 
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participants’ self-described experiences with Palestinians on the tour. Jews who travel to the 
West Bank are often met with shock and worry from their friends and family. Several 
participants described hiding their participation on the tour from loved ones, such as Eddie, 
who explains, “I didn’t tell any Israelis or my family or anything, so no one really 
discouraged me, but for the reason that I didn’t tell them.” Fernando took a similar approach, 
“I didn’t really discuss it. I didn’t bring it up with my family. I didn’t want to scare people 
who would say “ya well you shouldn’t go” I didn’t want to expose myself to the situation; I 
didn’t want people telling me not to go. So I was like I’m just going to go and not tell them.” 
Jewish-Americans are bombarded by a pervasive Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism 
that perpetuates stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs, and in particular Palestinians, as 
dangerous and violent. The Islamophobia that is present throughout the United States is 
intensified by further demonization that sometimes occurs at Jewish day schools and 
Synagogues. As Maggie recounts from her days in Jewish Sunday School: 
They showed us like the Palestinian Sesame Street where they have all the kids with 
the guns. They showed us that, like “that’s the enemy,” and that’s about all we got… 
It’s pretty shocking, I mean you definitely develop a sense of the enemy.  
 
Therefore, despite the abundance of foreign visitors who safely travel throughout the West 
Bank each day, such racially motivated fears are common among tourists, especially Jews, 
and especially Jewish-Israelis. Tour participants often go into the West Bank having 
internalized such prejudices against Palestinians, for example, Louis explains: 
I went there expecting Palestinians to be really anti-American, anti-Jewish, and I 
guess anti-Israeli, and just be kind of bad and aggressive and horrible. And I was 
expecting Israelis to be the ones who are, I guess, there for a reason… and then I 
ended up leaving with the exact opposite feeling, and I realized that it was the 
Palestinians with a welcoming, open culture.  
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Tour participants with Israeli citizenship in particular showed heightened levels of fear 
during the tour, as they are legally barred from entering the West Bank and usually maintain 
a stronger collective memory of Palestinian violence against Israelis, including kidnappings 
and deadly clashes in the cities visited on the tour. Among the interviewees, Daisy, was one 
of the participants who held Israeli citizenship: 
I thought it was just going to be like the West Bank checkpoints rather than going into 
proper Palestinian territories, so when I found out, I was pretty scared. I was just like 
oh my god, I’m breaking the law, and I remember telling my boyfriend, I don’t know 
if I can go through with this… I was just afraid that I might be taken as like a 
prize…that’s what my fear was… we were walking out of the territories and we were 
going to the checkpoint, and some Palestinian authority who was like dressed up in 
his military uniform and stuff was like staring at me, that scared me…I feel like I 
could be a really easy captive.  
 
Daisy was not the only participant to express such feelings. Sasha, who did not hold Israeli 
citizenship, expressed similar fears: 
I was such a nervous wreck the whole time I was there, I thought someone was going 
to kill me, not kill me but, so I was nervous because I had never been looked at by 
that many people that horribly. 
 
While Sasha and Daisy’s fears were exceptionally pronounced, other participants expressed 
similar sentiments of worry and distrust. This fear was often interwoven with participants’ 
more practical fear of breaking their programs’ bans on travel to the West Bank. Several of 
the tour participants were currently enrolled in long-term Zionist programs in Israel that 
explicitly prohibited travel to the OPT. These participants risked punishment from their 
sponsoring organizations, which could amount to the termination of their internships and 
scholarships. 
Implied in this strict ban on travel to the West Bank, is the underlying message that 
Palestinians are dangerous, and under no circumstances is such travel worth the risk. These 
restrictive policies are often bolstered by racist rhetoric that reinforces participants’ 
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prejudices against Palestinians. As Maggie recounts from the moment her Birthright bus 
drove by the separation wall “They [birthright] make it [West Bank] look like this run-down, 
no rules, ghetto of some kind, it’s just like the heathens on the other side, it’s just like so 
ridiculous. Like if Israel wasn’t there to control, to contain them...” Program coordinators 
appear to prefer to leave the West Bank unexplored, so that they can shape participants 
understandings of Palestinians through propaganda that reinforces negative stereotypes of 
Palestinians as violent, uncompromising, and uncivilized.9 
With this type of depiction of Palestinians and the OPT openly promoted by 
organizations like Birthright, it is not surprising that few participants challenge their 
organization’s policies. Any tourist who chooses to complement his or her birthright trip with 
the Walls2Windows tour is likely to already hold somewhat critical positions or at least a 
curiosity to challenge their current views. Making the choice to break the ban can be 
difficult, not only because of the potential risk of expulsion from their programs, but also 
because, despite self-proclamations of open-mindedness, prejudiced views against 
Palestinians are of course prevalent among American Jews, as discussed by a number of the 
interviewees. The following quote from Benji demonstrates the thought-process behind his 
decision to break the ban, and also how participants’ fears of breaking rules are often tied to 
deeper fears for their safety. 
The fact that I had to sort of keep the tour a secret from the administration was again 
something I sort of had to wrap my head around …I think I really came to Israel at 
that time with zero intention of going to the West Bank …I think the political 
situation was pretty tense… …I think the restriction by the program davka … the 
prohibition was ridiculous. And when Andrew [his roommate] volunteered with you 
guys… he said that “yo they’re safe; I do them every two weeks…come.” …I think 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 http://www.jewlicious.com/2012/06/the-unofficial-13-dos-and-donts-of-birthright-israel/ 
http://birthrightdetoured.blogspot.com/2008/08/another-unbearable-discussion.html 
http://mondoweiss.net/2014/10/birthright-participants-present 
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that was my opening to say, you know okay, I’m going to be safe…I looked at the 
itinerary and I looked at the history of the organization and how they’ve been giving 
these tours and I said…“okay…you know I’m willing to do it.” [I also started to 
think] again, how ridiculous is it that…I can’t speak with my counterpart? I can’t see 
my counterpart. 
 
For Benji, the travel ban actually appeared to be more of a motivating factor to go on the 
tour, while the real element of deterrence was fear for his safety. Benji is one of several 
participants whose fears may have prevented him from traveling to the West Bank, had it not 
been for a personal connection that he trusted. The number of participants who described this 
need for an “insider” whom they could trust in order to gain the courage to go on the tour, 
exemplifies the underlying distrust that many Jewish tourists hold towards Palestinians. 
Therefore, while some participants expressed no qualms about traveling to the West Bank, in 
general, most treated their travel there as a serious undertaking that required careful 
consideration, usually due to fears for their safety. 
 
 3.3.2 Developing Empathy; Overcoming Prejudice 
This experience of overcoming fears about traveling to the West Bank was frequently 
coupled with a process of “humanization” that challenged participants’ preconceived 
stereotypes of Palestinians as dangerous and violent. As Mark explains: 
One thing that really did stand out to me is talking to the Palestinians. You know it 
seems like no one wants peace and that’s definitely not the case. As I said, the vast 
majority of everyone I talked to both on the Windows tour and elsewhere you know 
wanted peace, and were not these you know gun-happy or explosive-happy people 
that just wanted to blow up themselves or whatever. … if you’re able to separate 
yourself from the emotion and really take a wholesome look you know they just want 
the basic necessities and they want to be able to have a normal life and not have to 
worry about oppression from other people. 
 
Anna voices a similar reaction: 
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All I could think was these are such lovely people, and all they want is the 
opportunity and chance to live the way the rest of us do, and they deserve that. … 
these are just honest, good-hearted people, they don’t want to kill anyone, they don’t 
want to hurt anyone, they just want to go to work and provide for their families, and 
shouldn’t everyone have that right? 
 
In addition to those participants such as Mark and Louis, who understood this humanization 
in terms of “correcting” prejudiced views of Palestinians, others described it in terms of 
increased feelings of empathy with Palestinians. For example, Fernando states, in response to 
hearing a Palestinian speak about the situation in Hebron, “you really feel empathetic on the 
tours…you can definitely understand if you put yourself in this situation.” In addition, Daisy 
explains: 
I never had a face to the name, and now it’s like, I can still remember this guy’s face 
that just like stuck out to me and you know, they are people. And it’s sad when you 
think about the situation, you always think about the aggressors who are involved, 
and you don’t necessarily think about the casual, you know the civilian, and now that 
I’ve been able to meet some of the civilians… it definitely changed my opinion, or 
like my sympathy. 
 
Daisy is quick to correct herself by stating that the experience of meeting Palestinians 
changed her sympathy rather than her opinion. Daisy, like many of the “supportive” 
participants, underwent a profound experience of humanization, while still maintaining 
political positions that supported Israeli policies and institutions. In particular, such 
participants appeared to be moved by experiences where they had warm, positive interactions 
with their Palestinian hosts. For example, Louis was struck by an experience with a cab 
driver who asked him if he was Jewish, and after replying yes, the driver spoke at length 
about how grateful he was to have him here in Palestine. Bryce was moved by the generosity 
of a family from the refugee camp: 
 I was blown away by how the fact that, having tea together, or coffee that always 
stuck with me, that, you know, even people who have such a hard time…such 
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circumstances and just how they make guests feel warm and hospitable, …[it] made 
me feel very much welcomed. 
 
For Benji, such moments of warmth and generosity were significant not so much due to the 
family’s dire situation, but in light of political differences. As he explains: 
It was very interesting that the brother of this…who they would consider a martyr, 
whom I might consider a terrorist, …he gave me several firm handshakes and he 
patted me on the shoulder and he even welcomed me for a hug as we were walking 
out. 
 
Jamie expresses a similar sentiment, as she states, “The main thing is that it [the tour] 
humanized it [Palestine]. And I felt it more deeply because I have images that I can associate 
with what I’m learning and hearing about it.”  
 
3.3.3 Humanization and Information 
The tendency to recount experiences of increased empathy and humanization towards 
Palestinians correlated with participants’ political positions. Every participant with 
“supportive” politics reported a profound “humanization” experience, while most of the 
participants with “dissenting” views did not, and instead saw the tour as a source of 
information. Dissenting participants usually focused on how the tour provided them with 
knowledge and information to strengthen their opinions and back up feelings they had before 
the tour. For example, Eddie talked about having the same views and opinions after the tour, 
but gaining more knowledge and evidence to support his feelings. 
Just seeing everything made me feel stronger about things… I felt like it gave me 
more of the tools to be able to deal with these things, just in the sense that I was able 
to think about things that I hadn’t thought about before, and just have a perspective 
that I didn’t have before, you know before that, I couldn’t say I’ve been there, I’ve 
seen it, you know? 
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Also for Rachel, rather than experiencing a process of humanization or feelings of increased 
empathy, she referred to the tour more so in terms of gaining knowledge: 
I felt much more informed after that, like much more knowledgeable, and like I could 
support the more intangible feelings that I had been feeling... I felt like I had learned 
more, so that I could actually put words behind my feelings … I don’t think I would 
have necessarily felt much differently if I hadn’t gone… so I would have felt that way 
regardless and maybe my thoughts on the Palestinian situation would have been a 
little bit more blurry, I wouldn’t have had as much tangible things to think about and 
to hold on to in my thought process.  
 
This pattern could be explained in that those participants with “dissenting” politics were less 
likely to dehumanize Palestinians in the first place. However, regardless of the reason for this 
trend, such a correlation suggests that humanization and empathy do not always prompt a 
subsequent change in politics. In other words, some tourists with newly realized empathy for 
Palestinians will still continue to support policies that oppress them.  
This is all not to deny that increased empathy and reduced prejudices are not positive 
results of these tours. Despite maintaining support for Israeli policies, the “supportive” 
participants still exhibited significant changes in their behaviors and opinions. For example, 
Benji describes no longer tolerating jokes about soldiers harassing Palestinians: 
With my own eyes I saw how dehumanizing that is … I can’t joke at that type of 
thing anymore… I sort of vomit a little bit inside when I hear the joking about 
something as filthy and disgusting and dehumanizing as that. 
 
Similarly Daisy recounts an incident where she stood up to anti-Arab rhetoric: 
I think I’m more outspoken on those issues, because I think that I sympathize more 
with others, for example, we were at this rally …and there was just some old fart who 
was crossing the street with an Israeli flag …and was like “let’s just kill them all.” 
And I was like, dude, I went up to him and I was like, you can’t say that… he was 
just like oh, I didn’t mean it like that, it’s just like a figure of speech. And I was like 
“that it’s a figure of speech is not ok.”  
 
Therefore while the tour did seem to motivate participants to hold less prejudiced views of 
Palestinians, and to subsequently stand up to bigotry and violence, it is important to ask what 
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this change in perception amounts to in terms of stated political positions and conventional 
forms of activism. How beneficial are the effects of these humanizing experiences to the 
Palestinian cause?  Is this something we can even measure? Do they normalize injustice by 
allowing people to relieve themselves of responsibility? Do they individualize issues like 
state violence to be a problem of a few extremists, so as to prevent participants from 
understanding the state’s role in the conflict?  
 
 3.3.4 Separating Empathy from Politics 
It is often assumed that increased empathy for a group of people will lead to greater 
concern for their rights and well-being. While all of the “supportive” participants reported a 
process of humanization and/or increased empathy with Palestinians after the tour, this did 
not consistently lead to changes in their political views regarding Israel’s culpability. Such 
participants relied on a variety of cognitive maneuvers to justify their continued support for 
Israel’s oppressive policies in the face of their newfound empathy for Palestinians.  
The two main strategies that participants used to explain their support for Israel’s 
oppression of Palestinians included seeing themselves as victims in need of a “safe haven” 
(i.e. a Jewish state) or scapegoating radical segments of the population. The first strategy 
allowed participants to see themselves as the more vulnerable population, therefore justifying 
violence against Palestinians for the sake of their “own people’s” safety. The second strategy 
of scapegoating settlers allowed participants to recognize the severity of Palestinians’ 
situation without faulting the state of Israel. By focusing on the acts of radical settlers, 
participants were able to condemn the effects of the occupation without criticizing the Israeli 
government or army. As Daisy explains:  
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Ok, the settlers there are crazy. … I think it was a very valuable experience for me, 
the Jews that live in Hebron and other like super religious territories in the West Bank 
that they claim like Schem and whatever, they’re insane, like they are so radical 
crazy, he almost ran over us, so aggressive, disgusting people …I felt so sorry for the 
Palestinians and their situation, but I guess the people who I could most sympathize 
with are the soldiers … they’re hated both ways… and that was really hard to see. 
 
In addition to Daisy, Fernando, and Benji also singled out radical settlers for their role in the 
conflict: 
I think the biggest question is how do we move past this culture of… …glorifying 
martyrdom, glorifying homicide bombers, glorifying violence…I think the same is 
true on the Israeli side …to see this growth of radicalism, violent radicalism, within 
the Jewish community which here so far has been pretty much marginalized, but to 
see it growing …and to see it being so provocative is really bothersome to me.  
 
In this quote, Benji equates radical settlers’ violence with Palestinian extremism, moving 
blame away from the Israeli state and instead towards extremists on both sides of the conflict. 
Fernando, arguably the most “supportive” participant on the tour, also criticized the settlers: 
I cannot myself identify with the settlers …coming from a secular background …the 
argument that they are there because God said so. At that moment I felt a little bit of 
anger… I am very critical of the settlement policy. 
 
While a focus on the settlers was less common among those participants with dissenting 
views, participants like Jamie also raised the issue of the settlements.  
And the settlers also really rubbed me the wrong way, and I mentioned them speeding 
up. …I just thought it was disgusting, absolutely disgusting, and you know when I 
hear constantly that settlers are settling into these areas … there’s just a power trip 
going on, and I think given my Grandma’s a Holocaust survivor, I would have a way 
bigger family if the Holocaust didn’t happen, and the Jewish population would be so 
much bigger, and I was just thinking about that and thinking about how we were 
treated and the parallels with how we’re treating the Palestinians, and it really makes 
me sick. 
 
Unlike the supportive participants however, Jamie concludes with, “how we’re treating the 
Palestinians.” Rather than using the settlers as a scapegoat, she sees herself, and all Jews, as 
part of the oppressor group. While Jamie was able to tie her criticism of the settlers to the 
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Israeli state, those participants who primarily saw settlers as isolated extremists maintained 
general support for Israeli institutions, especially the army. 
Through cognitive methods such as this, many of the participants expressed strong 
levels of empathy with Palestinians, while still maintaining a generalized support for the state 
of Israel. In fact, those participants who described the strongest personal reactions to meeting 
Palestinians simultaneously retained the strongest support for Israeli policies and state 
violence against them. Despite their newfound humanization, participants such as Daisy and 
Mark supported Israel’s actions in Gaza, while others such as Bryce and Benji also 
maintained relatively supportive views. Fernando even articulated his intentional separation 
of his empathy towards Palestinians from a change in his political positions, as he explains:  
The majority of the people on the tour didn’t really know about this issue, didn’t 
really know about politics. So if you don’t know anything… you go to this sort of 
tour and immediately think, “oh, Israel is an apartheid state”... because you can feel 
honest empathy for them [Palestinians]. But if you don’t sort of develop the political 
background, a history of the region, it [the tour] doesn’t seem fair. 
 
He later expressed a similar sentiment, when he explained that despite the empathy he felt for 
Palestinians suffering from the separation barrier, this empathy did not affect his belief in the 
wall’s necessity: 
I understand the necessity of having this separation barrier… I believe that human 
lives are more important than…you know, it’s better to save a life than having people 
just waiting for hours to get back. Unfortunately it’s a necessity. But nonetheless… 
these people have to go through, a lot of things, just to get on with their daily lives. 
So, I was very empathetic at that moment. 
 
Fernando’s resistance to letting his empathy change his political positions was exceptional, 
as most participants with “supportive” views expressed some distress over their political 
positions. For example, Sasha, who explained in reference to the Israeli assault on Gaza, “I 
hate the fact that we have to be there and it’s killing me that so many people are dying, 
 	   66	  
because I also want my safety, and I feel guilty saying that, and it’s hard, I’ve been really 
really really torn about how I feel.” Similarly, when I asked Daisy whether it is conflicting 
for her to support the war in Gaza after her experiences in the West Bank, she replied: 
Yeah of course… I feel for the citizens, the casualties, I fear for the mothers, I can’t 
imagine, not even mothers, but anyone who is not involved with Hamas … but at the 
same time, it’s kind of like, I have to stand by Israel at this time, just because 
…Israel’s existence is more important for me, because I’m Israeli, I’m Jewish… 
Grandfather was in the Holocaust, my dad was oppressed, kicked out of Iraq, grew up 
in a tent, my Grandmother on my mother’s side witnessed her brother’s head being 
chopped off in front of her because of the pogroms, yes I’m in America, I feel secure 
here for now, but it’s like, the anti-Semitism is rising… I fear for my people, I really 
feel like we need to have a safe haven and to defend ourselves. It’s kind of like, I 
don’t prioritize one life over another, but since I do belong to these people, I side with 
them, I have to.  
 
Daisy’s answer is interesting because she does not defend Israel’s actions as moral or 
strategically necessary, but instead describes her support for Israel as an act of ethnic 
solidarity rooted in her people’s previous suffering. For Daisy, along with the other 
“supportive” Zionists, anti-Semitism and the need for a “safe haven” were leading 
justifications for their continued support of Israeli violence against Palestinians, despite their 
increased empathy towards them.  
For others however, collective Jewish consciousness of anti-Semitism and the 
Holocaust appeared to facilitate rather than hinder empathy with the Palestinians. Several 
participants expressed the belief that Jews should be more conscious of other groups’ 
oppression on account of their own experience with persecution. For example Mark explains: 
I think it would be very hypocritical to have a Jewish state that was founded on the 
principles of everything that happened in history, especially the Holocaust, and all the 
oppression throughout the years, and then to try to do the same thing to other people, 
I don’t think that’s right either.  
 
Maggie used similar language of “doing the same thing” to Palestinians: 
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To go and see that all these people who escaped the Holocaust are doing the exact 
same thing, like not exact, but like pretty much, it’s like phase one of the Holocaust. 
So how does no one in this country put it together? Cause nobody does! Like when 
you talk to anybody on Birthright it’s like this is all sane… You feel like a crazy 
person. To me it sounded like there was no difference between phase one of the 
Holocaust and like seeing these refugees camps and seeing what’s going on there… it 
looks like the exact same thing. 
 
In addition, Jamie reflects: 
 
In reflection, thinking about going there and standing there and waiting in the line 
myself and getting on the bus on the other side and just how, I mean… it really just 
reminds me of [Jewish] ghettos, of being in these barbed wired spaces were you’re 
smushed together. 
 
Other participants were hesitant to make such comparisons, though references to Holocaust 
were still evident in their processing of the tour. For example, Benji states: 
I needed to see firsthand what does it mean to be in a refugee camp…you know I’m a 
descendent of Holocaust survivors and …there are more reasons than any reason 
possible that the Holocaust and the Shoah had nothing to do with the current state on 
the ground. But, at the same time, human suffering is unacceptable…Israel is not 
committing genocide…and there is no racial cleansing and there is no systematic 
destruction of a people. But, there is human suffering. 
   
While Benji is adamant that the Palestinian experience does not equate with the Jewish 
Holocaust, his reasons for wanting to understand Palestinians’ suffering appear deeply tied to 
his own family’s history of persecution. Participants with a variety of political backgrounds 
and Zionist identities voluntarily made these sorts of connections between what they 
witnessed in the West Bank and the Holocaust. However unlike most of the other 
participants, the non-Zionist, dissenting participants did not relate anti-Semitism and the 
Holocaust to the need for a Jewish state. As Maggie explains: 
I always thought that it [Israel] was important... but the more I learn about it …it’s 
weird to say, but I’m not sure how important Israel is to everything… Judaism existed 
for a very, very long time without a country and I’m sure it will continue to exist, it’s 
not like the Jews are isolated to Israel and like if Israel goes away, it’s not like Jews 
are going to go away. 
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Maggie comes to this bold conclusion after previously explaining how her own identification 
as a religious Jew, rather than a cultural or ethnic Jew, allows her to hold this position 
without moral equivocation. As she explains: 
I don’t primarily identify as a cultural Jew, I primarily identify religiously… but I 
would say that people who don’t identify religiously, and identify very 
culturally…[who] go and see that [Palestine], would say, “I think of myself as part of 
this group of people, and they’re clearly just like treating this other group of people so 
horribly and doing these horrible things,” I think that would be very troubling for 
your Jewish identity. For me, my Jewish identity is tied to religious teachings and 
morals and that kind of stuff, so for me, it’s more, it’s kind of crazy to see this group 
of people that is founded on Judaism doing things that to me seem so against the 
Jewish faith and against the Jewish teachings. 
 
Maggie’s analysis seems to be correct, in that those participants who identified with the 
“people of Israel” through their Judaism were more troubled by their solidarity with 
Palestinians than those who saw their Judaism as separate from Israel. For example, Louis, 
another dissenting, non-Zionist, stated, “I feel absolutely no connection at this point with the 
government or any of the people of Israel with my own relationship to Judaism…I don’t feel 
like the government of Israel has anything to do with my faith at all.” Similarly, Rachel, one 
of the other dissenting, non-Zionists recounts an experience at a diversity training program, 
where she wished to correct people about Jewish support for Israel. As she remembers: 
There was this one exercise where you put on the paper whatever it is that you are, 
your thing, and then you write down what the stereotypes are that people have about 
you that you wish they didn’t have… and mine, I was Jewish, and no one else was 
Jewish, the students hardly even know what it means to be Jewish except when they 
see like the Hasidics in Brooklyn, they’re like really? Why aren’t you wearing a skirt? 
But I remember thinking about like what are the stereotypes that people have about 
me because I’m Jewish that I want to tell that not to have, and the main thing that I 
could come up with was … being Jewish doesn’t define how I feel about Israel and 
Palestine, and I think that that is like probably one of the biggest, like I think one of 
the biggest stereotypes out there, I think most people in America assume like if 
you’re Jewish then you’re pro-Israel. 
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While Zionism doesn’t always correlate with someone’s level of criticism for the Israeli 
state, it does seem to correlate with the emotional turmoil one feels when voicing that 
criticism, as well as the importance of anti-Semitism in regards to Jewish “safety” and the 
need for a state. The more important the idea of a Jewish state was to someone, the more 
difficult it appeared for him or her to emotionally manage his or her criticism of Israel. The 
non-Zionist, dissenting participants expressed little emotional distress, just as both the 
supportive non-Zionists and Zionists were fairly comfortable in their opinions. However, the 
Zionists who held “dissenting,” views expressed the greatest level of worry and frustration 
over their positions. Therefore while people can certainly hold a favorable stance towards 
Jewish nationalism that “contradicts” their support for Palestinians, it does come at emotional 
and ideological costs. Perhaps this contradiction though is what gives some people meaning 
in their Judaism and Zionism, and while it may be difficult, it ultimately serves a positive 
function for their identity formation.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
Stuart Hall (1994) reminds his readers that in diaspora identity, there is no monolithic 
sameness, but endless difference, composed of varied personal relationships to a shared 
narrative and past. The findings of this study illustrate just that, as each participant articulated 
a unique, nuanced relationship to Israel and his or her Zionist or non-Zionist identity. These 
relationships are complex, contradictory, and full of entangled emotional and political 
reflection that can produce valuable resistance to Israel’s treatment of Palestinians.  
Furthermore, the findings from this study suggest that contrary to popular perception, 
there is no necessary link between being a Zionist and one’s level of criticism towards the 
Israeli state. Some of the most ardent supporters of the Israeli state rejected Jewish 
nationalism, while many of the participants who voiced highly critical positions on Israel 
were adamant about the need for a Jewish state, and often identified as Zionists. This raises 
interesting questions about the relationship between nationalism and criticism of the state, 
and how the word Zionism has come to be used and understood by young Jews today. Has 
the word “Zionist” lost some of its relevance as a label for those who support oppressive 
policies against Palestinians? Is nationalist identity the major force that binds people to a 
state, or are there other more dominant forces, forces that are more complicated and latent 
than nationalism, that sustain individuals’ support for a base country?  
When one compares the Zionist tour participants who are critical of Israel to the non-
Zionist participants who are also critical of Israel, the main difference is not the intensity of 
their critiques, but their levels of engagement, both in terms of ideological reflection and 
conventional activism. Interviewees with dissenting views, who did not identify as Zionist, 
did not offer significantly harsher critiques of Israeli policies than the dissenting Zionists. In 
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fact, the Zionist dissenters were often even more critical of the occupation and Israel’s 
actions in Gaza than the non-Zionists. Accordingly, the primary distinction between the non-
Zionist and Zionist participants with similar political positions is that the non-Zionists tended 
to see themselves as less active, less concerned, and less knowledgeable about the situation in 
Israel/Palestine. Rather than a marker of support for the Israeli state, Zionism among 
American Jews who travel to the West Bank appears to function as a marker of engagement 
with the region.  
This conclusion is supported by the fact that several of the most “supportive” 
participants did not call themselves Zionists. These counter-intuitive responses trouble the 
supposed link between diaspora nationalisms and political support for a “base” country, and 
they complicate the assumed contradiction between Zionism and identification with the 
Palestinian cause. This finding suggests that diaspora populations are capable of maintaining 
their ties to a base country, while still holding dissenting views against the state and its 
institutions. In addition, it also implies that just as individuals are able to see themselves as 
part of a national collective while espousing sharp criticism of the “base” country, it is also 
possible for individuals in the diaspora to support the state’s policies without identifying with 
the country’s nationalism. In other words, supporting a diaspora state does not guarantee 
stronger nationalist sentiments, and those individuals who see themselves as part of a 
diaspora nationalism are just as capable of criticizing the state, as those who choose to 
dissociate from that national identity.  
At the same time however, it is not as if such political dissent coexists harmoniously 
with diaspora nationalism. Almost all participants expressed some degree of ideological 
turmoil over apparent contradictions between their Zionism and support for Palestinians. This 
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distress varied according to the degree of the participant’s criticism, coupled with the tenacity 
of his or her Zionism. As such, tour participants who were sympathetic to Zionism but still 
held “dissenting” positions seemed to experience the highest levels of ideological turmoil. 
Likewise, those participants with “supportive” views, as well as those who rejected Zionism, 
showed significantly less distress over their identities. Therefore, while Zionism may mean 
something different to Israelis, Palestinians, or outside populations, for young American-
Jewish tourists to the West Bank, Zionist identity appears to be most closely associated with 
a deep and reflective engagement with the situation in Israel/Palestine. 
It was this combination of Zionism with a commitment to criticizing Israeli policies 
and institutions that appeared to not only produce the highest level of identity-based turmoil, 
but also the highest level of peace and justice activism. Rather than holding conventionally 
aligned political views and national identities, it was the distress that came from the 
contradiction of these two elements of one’s identity that appeared to compel people to take 
action: that is, when their diaspora nation acted in ways that were politically and morally 
upsetting to them. While I do not mean to suggest that this type of national identity is a 
prerequisite for such activism, as anti-Zionist Jewish activism on Israel/Palestine is vibrant 
and growing, in the case of Jewish tourists to Israel, such nationalist ties seem to foster 
continued engagement among more critical tour participants. This suggests that diaspora 
Jews may rely on Zionism in order to maintain a voice, albeit sometimes a critical one, in the 
conversation on Israel/Palestine. Without Zionism, it becomes more difficult for diaspora 
Jews to see themselves as legitimate participants in Israeli affairs, as their connection to the 
state is strained when the nation is no longer defined to include them.   
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This implies, as Rodriguez (2003) argues, that it is actually the contradictions in our 
identities that produce new knowledge, and in this case, new commitments to justice and 
transnational activism. Rather than stifle engagement, difficulty and struggle in one’s 
diaspora national identity actually sustains one’s political involvement with the base country. 
This finding coincides with Taylor, Levi, and Dinovitzer’s (2012) conclusion, that young 
Jewish tourists often find meaning in their relationships to Israel through the ideological 
complexities and emotional difficulties that traveling there presents. It also resonates with 
Sasson’s (2010) argument that the rising criticism towards Israel from American Jews is not 
evidence of their abandoning Israel, but rather an expression of their concern for it. While 
this thesis does not argue that criticism of Israel is actually an expression of love for it, 
though for some individuals this may be true, I do propose that nationalist sentiments 
towards Israel can actually cultivate pro-Palestinian activism, and that often times without 
this underlying nationalism, diaspora Jews may be more likely to turn their backs on the 
situation entirely.  
In addition to reaffirming the complexity of Jews’ diaspora identities, as well as the 
power of tension within identities to promote activism, this study also sheds light on Singh’s 
(2005) argument regarding the position of oppressed populations’ in promoting more just 
universalisms. Despite the taboo in the Jewish community against comparing Palestinians’ 
suffering to the Holocaust, a range of participants from all nationalist and political positions 
voiced such comparisons without prompting from the tour guide or interviewer. While a 
small number of participants discussed the Holocaust in terms of justifying continued 
violence against Palestinians, a larger number of tour attendees evoked the memory of the 
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Holocaust to draw connections to their own people’s history with the current situation in the 
OPT.  
This findings suggests that, given the opportunity, members of a marginalized, or 
previously marginalized group, may apply their own history of oppression to current 
instances of suffering, even when their own ethnic group is the oppressor. Even though there 
is intense pressure on Jewish tourists to Israel to see the conflict with the Palestinians as an 
extension of the fight for Jewish liberation, once face-to-face with Israel’s brutality towards 
Palestinians, many participants challenged this narrative by instead seeing themselves as the 
oppressors doing the “same thing” that was done to them during the Holocaust,  
Therefore while in its current condition Zionism has taken on the form of a violent, 
ethnic nationalism, once removed from the mainstream narrative and confronted with the 
Palestinian perspective, some individuals are able to experience their relationship to the 
Jewish state through solidarity with its victims. This suggests that tourism is perhaps an 
effective way to challenge what Cohen terms “cultural denial,” supporting the hypothesis that 
a single travel experience can cause individuals to reorient their relationship to a nationalist 
narrative, and move from seeing themselves as the victims to seeing themselves as the 
oppressors. 
A major part of this process is developing feelings of increased empathy, which as 
seen in the interview responses, is often rooted in an initial process of humanization. Jamie 
sums up this ideological journey from humanization to empathy to connecting these 
experiences to one’s own history of oppression, when she states: “I was just like, these are 
people just like us, you know, this could have been us, this was us.” Not all participants 
however followed this path of realization on the tour. Many of the “supportive” participants 
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went through a profound humanization experience and felt increased levels of empathy, but 
were unable or unwilling to directly relate this to the Jewish people’s role in the Palestinian 
plight. Through methods such as scapegoating radical segments of the Jewish-Israeli 
population, as well as continuing to see themselves as persecuted victims in need of 
protection, these participants felt heightened levels of empathy and humanization, but did not 
implicate themselves in terms of perpetuating Palestinians’ oppression. This in turn appeared 
to lessen their motivation to become activists for Palestinians’ rights.  
For non-Zionist participants with dissenting views, experiences of humanization and 
empathy also occurred, however, because they were relatively disconnected from their own 
identification with the Jewish people as a nation or ethnicity, they also felt less compelled to 
act, since they did not consider themselves to be a part of the oppressor group. Ultimately, it 
was those participants who identified as Zionist, or felt a strong connection to the Jewish 
people, but still maintained criticism of the Israeli state, who were most likely to take action 
for Palestinian liberation. The tours allowed such participants to gain exposure to 
Palestinians’ suffering in a way that alarmed them of the need to be activists, while 
simultaneously deepening their relationship to Israel. These participants engaged in the most 
direct forms of peace and justice activism, despite having the most complicated and 
contradictory diaspora identities.  
While such tours do not seem to reverse or undo national narratives, they work in 
varied, but consistently powerful ways within those narratives, uniquely affecting different 
groups and different individuals. For those without a strong connection to Israel/Palestine, 
they alert them of the severity of the situation, cause them to pay more attention to the media 
and public events on the region, and give them experiences and opinions to relay in 
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conversations on the topic. Such participants appear to be the most impressionable, but also 
the most reserved in their activism. For those who have already engaged in the topic from a 
critical perspective, the tour gives them facts and anecdotes to back their positions and 
feelings, and it often motivates them to become or continue to be activists. Such participants 
organize protests, work in peace-building organizations, and start campus groups to shift the 
conversation on Israel/Palestine and contribute to the movement for a just peace. They do not 
necessarily change their opinions like members of the previous group, but they become more 
deeply involved in the conflict through a process of emotional turmoil that then serves to 
prompt and sustain their activism.  
Finally those participants who come into the tour with less sympathetic views towards 
Palestinians, report few changes in opinion, but instead experience profound increases in 
empathy through a process of humanizing Palestinians. On the one hand, this reveals the 
failure of “humanizing” experiences such as alternative tours to decidedly shift participants’ 
political thinking, as most of the “supportive” participants continue to espouse ideology and 
engage in activism that support Israeli policies and institutions. On the other hand however, 
many of these more supportive participants underwent intense shifts in their thinking that 
manifested themselves in subtle, but significant ways.  
Immediately after the tour, participants fill out an exit survey in which they are asked 
if the tour “changed their perception of the conflict.” Daisy, one of the supportive, Zionist 
participants replied, “Yes, definitely. I got to finally see Palestinians as people and 
understand their perspective from both an emotional and rational view.” She later added in 
reference to the situation in Hebron, “Shocking! Made me reconsider the entire situation.” 
Though Daisy continues to raise money for the Israeli army and continues to see herself as a 
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proud Zionist who must stand behind Israel, as she said herself, her blind Zionism is now not 
so blind. Following the tour, Daisy took a critical eye to her own political views and national 
identity. Today she carries this reflective approach and increased empathy towards 
Palestinians with her, whether it is standing up to bigotry at a pro-Israel rally, educating her 
friends about the hardships that Palestinians endure, or encouraging others to travel to the 
West Bank. As she explains:  
I think that they [my friends] understand after having a conversation with me, that 
they might not understand the complexities …I would tell them what’s going on there 
and how Palestinian people are living, having them line up in order to go the mosque, 
I would tell them about that… And I would tell them, “Just go to Hebron”…I think 
that one of my friends actually went on the Windows tour through me.... I think that 
they were shocked, they didn’t want to believe. And I didn’t want to believe either. 
 
Seeing is not believing. Every participant on the tour saw the same checkpoints, the 
same wall, the same stories of suffering and oppression, but each walked away believing 
something different. Zionist identity is not a fragile set of lies that once revealed to be untrue, 
will crumble as people flock to join the “other side.” Instead, such identities, narratives, and 
nationalisms are deeply rooted in genuine experiences of collective memory and ethnic 
solidarity that run much deeper than any set of facts. Nonetheless with respect to these 
identities and their truths, as Said, Rodriguez, and Hall warn us, we must avoid seeing 
diaspora identities as static, and remember that they are always in process, always in tension. 
If we fail to remember this, our identities run the risk of falling into essentialist categories 
that relieve us of our responsibility to change and our responsibility to question our 
commitments to others and to ourselves. While these tours do not “undo” Zionist identities, 
they challenge and complicate them in ways that aid in the development of a more inclusive 
form of Jewish nationalism and greater recognition of Palestinians’ rights. They cause 
participants to question their relationships to Israel, and they promote ideological reflection 
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that ultimately translates into behaviors and actions that bring us closer to a more just society 
in Israel/Palestine. 
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